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Abstract 
 
The text looks at the concepts of microbes and sovereignty, not only to reveal that there are any 
number of links between them, but also to problematize their respective categorization as ‘natural’ 
and ‘social’. By examining the historically contingent beginnings of contemporary notions of 
sovereignty, as well as the socio-historical context around the scientific ‘discovery’ of microbes, the 
thesis aims to show that the modern idea of sovereignty involves imposing two different frameworks 
of understanding onto the world: one for the social world (in which sovereignty applies), and the 
‘natural’ world (beyond sovereignty). The ‘rediscovery’ of microbes in the second half of the 19th 
century was ostensibly the culmination of this dual framework of nature/society. However, more 
recent understandings of microbes have ended up disrupting this neat and familiar framework of 
nature/society. The disruption in turn requires the reconsideration not only of the strong division 
between the two, but a number of other concepts we have come to accept, such as individuality, 
positionality, sociality, agency, etc. 
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Introduction 
 
In the introduction to his book Kant and the Platypus, Umberto Eco asks “what has Kant got to 
do with the platypus?” and answers, “Nothing. […] And this should suffice to justify the title…” 
(2000: 1). He then goes on to elaborate his ‘nothing’ across several hundred pages. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, it takes many more pages to elaborate such a ‘nothing’ than the present text has 
taken in (at least) sketching the answer to the question ‘what have microbes got to do with sovereignty’: 
something. Nevertheless, this should suffice to justify the title. 
Further justification, however, if necessary, can be found in that the present text emerged from 
a program of Cultural Studies, which pride themselves on the premise of interdisciplinarity, and taking 
an askew look from the margins. I have endeavored here to take literally and seriously the basic instinct 
of those working in the field of Cultural Studies, that nothing is so small or unreal as not to deserve a 
closer look. Not just that, but all things – important things, banal things, material things, fictitious 
things – deserve to be placed next to one another and see how they look to each other. In that sense, 
the hope is that microbes and sovereignty can reflect back on one another such that they also shed 
light on themselves (and for us too).  
What complicates matters somewhat here is that the two phenomena studied happen to be 
invisible to the naked eye, and invisible in different ways: microbes are simply too small for the human 
gaze, requiring technology to become apparent, while sovereignty belongs to the order of entities only 
visible in their effects. What they do have in common, however, is that they are both ‘made visible’, 
most present to the human spirit, when something goes wrong, i.e. in illness or government 
breakdown. (And as we shall see, those two go together often.) 
I insist on this question of visibility (of what, to whom?) and invisibility (when?) because an 
important component in considering both microbes and sovereignty is that of observation. It turns 
out – to absolutely no one’s surprise – that observation depends as much on the one looking and one’s 
vantage point, as it does on what is being looked at. It is likely that microbes do not mean the same 
thing to an ill person as they do to one of sound health, for example, just as sovereignty means 
something different to a municipal clerk at their desk and a refugee at a border crossing. If there is 
one lesson of cultural studies, it is that the context that frames a particular issue is crucial. 
More than anything, then, the present text seeks to elaborate the context surrounding the 
issues of sovereignty and microbes. In so doing it brings together some historical background and 
certain theoretical notions, it notes the transfers of concepts and language from one discipline into 
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another, and it traces the threads that already tie these two phenomena together. It also recognizes 
that the context did not just happen as if by magic, but that it was elaborated by a series of figures – 
scientists, thinkers, observers. Luckily for us, the complexity of these figures allows for second looks, 
multiple layers of meaning, moral ambivalences and the like. Take Louis Pasteur, for example, whose 
work I discuss in Chapter IV. A man of undeniable genius and endless energy, a century and a half 
after he began his most serious work, it is more and more obvious that he was driven by less than 
purely scientific motives. And it is clear that his celebrity and influence derived in equal measure from 
who he was and from what contemporary French society needed him and his figure to be.  
Yet we must not see such complexity as simply contamination of scientific inquiry, as some 
impurity, which once removed, leaves only unadulterated science. On the contrary, we must try to see, 
that is to say, I will try to show, these complexities as constitutive of the scientific legacy of people 
like Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, Hugo Grotius, Thomas Robert Malthus, Pasteur… It is these 
complexities that form their positionality, going some way towards answering the aforementioned 
question: what was the vantage point from which they made their observations? All of which means 
that in order to reveal the context that frames these phenomena, it was important to (somewhat) 
reconstruct who it was that provided this framework and how they did it.  
Hence, in Chapter I, I look at how the novelty of map-making led to a new way of seeing ‘the 
world’, a notion that might have itself only recently emerged at that point. Combined with the 
circumstances in which the newly-born Dutch Republic found itself at the beginning of the 17th 
century, this led a daring young Delft jurist to come up with a few small but decisive innovations in 
political theory that allowed for a whole new way of thinking about sovereignty. Chapter II explores 
the emerging scientific world of the 1600s: through two complex figures, Galileo and van 
Leeuwenhoek, it shows the growing importance of ‘seeing’ instruments, first the telescope and then 
the microscope. Not only what they observed, but the way the two men observed, and the importance 
they imparted to observation itself, would all remain important thereafter. 
Chapter III deals with the rise and development of a new conceptual tool, mostly in the 18th 
century. Counting and statistics became an increasingly important matrix scientists and governments 
could apply to try to come to terms with Europe’s rising population, migration, and colonization. This 
period also cemented some of the notions first proposed in the previous century. To take a central 
aspect of the work as an example, if the 17th century proposed seeing nature as a resource, it was in 
the 18th century that this take on the world would become the dominant way of thinking.  
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The following chapter discusses how notions developed in the 17th century and methods 
developed in the 18th came to bear on the enormous changes caused by Europe’s industrialization in 
the 19th century. By the time we enter the golden age of microbiology, sometime after 1850, the context 
into which microbes emerge and their relation to the human world has already been heavily elaborated. 
Meaning that the role microbes would play when they first emerged into social consciousness was 
already largely delineated by what had come before. 
Chapter V follows both the full flowering of the sovereign paradigm from the 17th century and 
the expansion of significance of microbes for our world. Crucially, however, it also points to how 
these two successful strategies both drew on previous conceptual solutions and how each actually 
fueled the development of the other. For example, microbes emerge as a social force with the rise in 
population of European cities; but they only emerge as a social (and not merely some destructive 
‘natural’) force because of modes of governmentality already projected in the 18th century. And when 
they do take their place in the social world, the microbes are placed in the service of defending and 
developing the economies of sovereign countries as Grotius had understood them two hundred years 
prior. 
The same chapter also introduces the conceptual changes that follow reaching the limits of 
the dominant paradigm. Hence Chapter V also shifts from speaking about human figures (as in the 
first four chapters) to non-human agents of milk and microbes. The aim, as mentioned, is to shade 
the context around these issues. But significantly, the shift in focus or agency is also followed by a 
shift in the number of contexts. Namely, the goal is to go from microbes and sovereignty belonging 
to disparate domains and place them into one field, a single register, where they can be considered 
together.  
One further word on the structure of the text. I did not set out to write it in chronological 
order. I was fascinated with the Dutch 17th century, and specifically with Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, 
and sought to connect him with the figure of Louis Pasteur as it appears in the work of Bruno Latour. 
The rough temporal sequence of the chapters emerged from my efforts to write around this van 
Leeuwenhoek-Pasteur axis. For this purpose, however, and in particular in discussing the nature and 
pitfalls of Pasteur’s project, I felt it necessary to reach a near full century before van Leeuwenhoek 
and also elaborate another Dutch 17th century legacy: sovereignty. For now, this should suffice to 
justify the title… 
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Chapter I: The Geographer and His Maps 
 
Begin with Vermeer’s Geographer. The stunning blue of the robe, the light streaming through 
the window onto the face of the subject and the unfolded paper before him, the richly woven fabric 
casually draped over the table, the nearly invisible yet exquisite white and blue tiles along the bottom 
of the wall—. Beyond mere scopophilic pleasure, what does the choice of objects represented tell us 
about what we are looking at? The tiles along the floor, the big window, the fabulously luxuriant cloth, 
all speak of opulence. Which extends to the subject in the painting: he is neither a clergyman, nor an 
aristocrat, nor even a captain of industry; he seems not much more than a humble technician of some 
kind. Yet even one of no particular status or distinction is clad in a lush blue robe. We have stumbled 
upon him at work, lost in thought, his instrument in hand. 
The exquisite artefacts are of course Vermeer’s way of showcasing the extraordinary industry 
and ingenuity of the Dutch 17th century. Nor should we ignore that the subject is represented as 
youthful and in rude health. But let your eye wander a bit, and it is likely to go from window, down 
across the fabric, to the wooden box, up by the chair to the map on the wall, following the armoire’s 
shadow to the globe, slipping by the books to return to the window. The eye’s journey, 
circumnavigating the subject, only makes one recall that when Vermeer painted the canvas, the Dutch 
ruled the high seas, running a trade empire the world had not seen before. Indeed, the riches of the 
room before us are really the riches of the world brought to the Low Countries. Where are the man’s 
thoughts? The dividers in his hand tell us that he is not contemplating abstract philosophy, nor 
theological exegesis. No, his thoughts are much more practical, concerning the next shipment of 
textile, or new trade routes, or how to reach parts as yet unknown – something, in any case, that can 
be represented in quantity and on a map. 
 
The world of mapping 
Nine of Vermeer’s paintings feature maps (Snyder 2015). There are any number of ways in 
which map-making and painting were intertwined in the 17th century: map-makers and painters 
belonged to the same artist guild; they are both two-dimensional representations of three-dimensional 
things; they could be mere interior decoration, but could also confer status on either or both the 
subject of the map or one displaying it. Painting maps into a painting would be a way for a painter to 
show off technique, but also an effective way of conveying information. Thus, the map in the right 
top corner in The Geographer is from the first half of the 17th century by Willem Blaeu and shows 
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western part of Europe, southern Greenland, northern Africa, and a good piece of the northern 
Atlantic. It is oriented with the western coast of Europe at the top, a practice standard for Dutch maps 
of the 16th and 17th centuries (Snyder 2015). It also shows the ocean with less distortion than the 
European land, meaning that it is a navigation map. In The Art of Painting, Vermeer inserted a map of 
all seventeen Dutch provinces, even though the provinces had been split up since 1581 and Spain 
recognized the independence of seven of them in 1684 (effectively making the split permanent, as it 
remains today) (Koeman and van Egmond 2007). Is there a way to read this element that does not 
include the artist’s patriotism/nationalism? 
It is perhaps worth noting today that maps as we know them were still a relative novelty at the 
time. Although the first maps of the Low Countries go back to the first half of the 16th century, map-
making in the Dutch countries exploded in the 17th century (Koeman et al. 2007), becoming common 
decoration in middle class homes (Snyder 2015: 200). They were at once the latest technology, 
representing a far-away (even really far-away) part of the world, and intimate, personal items – maps 
were the World Wide Web of the 17th century.  
And much like the Internet of today, maps were initially military technology. One of the 
reasons the craft of maps expanded and changed rapidly in the Low Countries in the second half of 
the 16th century is that it was a tool for both the Spanish and the revolting provinces: “The best 
preserved illustrations [of war events and technical military innovations], are found in Spanish and 
Italian collections” (Koeman and van Egmond 2007: 1282). And these authors are careful to point 
out how many Dutch engineers who designed fortifications but also drew maps worked for Spain 
(ibid.). Those skills would be vital in the struggle of the Seven United Provinces for independence 
from Spain. In fact, a dynamic interesting for our present purposes develops here. Here are Koeman 
and van Egmond: 
Due to the lack of any strong central authority, general cartography rarely exceeded the 
boundaries of a single province. Thanks to the Union of Utrecht in 1579, defense became one 
of the few areas in which there was some centralization. Military mapmakers were not limited 
by provincial boundaries and thus produced maps that went beyond them. Moreover, there 
were fewer civilian maps available of areas of interest to the military – the “frontiers” – than 
there were of the economic center of the republic. This kind of mapping thus occupied a 
special place in the development of the cartography of the Low Countries (2007: 1285-6). 
 
Where maps were previously (during Spanish rule) primarily a map of locations of towns, necessity 
shifted their purpose to survey of ‘frontiers’. I cannot but wonder whether in the process of militarily 
mapping the borders of the Seven United Provinces, the military engineers were not also 
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simultaneously and unwittingly describing a new domain of sovereignty? Patrick Joyce (whose book 
on the 19th century city will be more relevant for Chapter IV of the present text) writes that “…the 
modern map [from the beginning of the 17th century] is essential to power and to the practices of 
governance” (2003: 36).  
My discussion here is nothing more than a reverse engineering of Koeman and van Egmond’s 
argument. At the beginning of their article, they write that “an account [of a history of Dutch mapping] 
is difficult to understand, however, without knowing the complex historical-political development of 
the Low Countries after the Middle Ages” (2007: 1246). My claim is merely that developments in map-
making also help us understand the “complex historical-political” events. 
 
Mapping the world 
We do not know about the maps on the floor, or even the one in front of the subject, but the 
recognizable map in Vermeer’s Geographer is, as I mentioned, for seafaring (Snyder 2015: 202). That is, 
its primary focus is the sea, not land. And the globe atop the cabinet is turned to the Indian Ocean – 
the Dutch were known for (and proudest of) their maritime quests. Indeed, it was globes, not wall 
maps that were responsible for the shift in representing the world. 
At this point it might be helpful to say a few words about the man most responsible for this 
shift, Gerardus Mercator, as there will be parallels with other figures in our narrative. If ever there 
were a transitional figure, Mercator is it. He studied in Leuven in the 1530s, genuinely interested in 
philosophy and theology, but which he had to put aside for the more commercial side of science 
(globe-making). He seems to have already been troubled by a tension between certain aspects of the 
Ptolemaic view of the world and Holy Scripture, and when he encountered Copernicus’ De 
revolutionibus, he was convinced of its truth immediately (Koeman et al. 2007). He was already 
producing high-quality globes in the 1540s and ‘50s. On the one hand, he was deeply influenced by 
Ancient philosophy and Medieval theology (remaining a devout Catholic his whole life) (Zuber 2011); 
on the other, Koeman et al. tell us that 
The publication of Mercator’s globe pair in Louvain represented the final step in the first phase 
of the history of globemaking in the Low Countries. During this phase, the globe 
metamorphosed from an expensive object, made by scholars to demonstrate the newly 
discovered areas and their ideas about the form of the world, into an object that was sold 
commercially and, with the inclusion of rhumb lines, suitable for ocean-going navigation 
(2007: 1360-1). 
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Mercator’s personal interests may have laid in the old way of using the globes, i.e. “ideas about 
the form of the world;” but what made him a household name was the practical and commercial side 
of his work. Indeed, Koeman et al. continue, saying that “Mercator lay the foundation for the 
enormous flourishing of globe manufacturing that would follow in Amsterdam” (2007: 1361). It was 
when Flemish cartography moved to Amsterdam, after 1585, that Mercator’s insights about globes, 
maps, representations of the world, seafaring straight lines across oceans would become truly 
weaponized.  
Only after his globe-making would come atlas-making and the famous Mercator projection, 
with which he is still deeply with us today. Yet Mercator sought to get back from mere technical work 
to natural philosophy, incorporating his knowledge of geography. But this was resisted by both his 
publishers and the Church authorities: he had to publish his 1592 Evangelicae historiae quadripartitas monas 
himself, and De mundi creatione ac fabrica was placed on the Index librorum prohibitorum of 1619 (Zuber 
2011). 
In this aspect, Mercator’s difficulties resemble that of Galileo (as we shall see in Chapter II). 
Mario Biagioli shows in Galileo’s Instruments of Credit that the Italian attempted to “…turn a hierarchical 
relationship between theology and astronomy into a parallel one…” (2006: 232). And Mike Zuber tells 
us that “…Mercator’s own natural philosophy was a transgression of disciplinary boundaries,” (2011: 
516) and that in his texts, he “…actively moulded the hierarchy of the disciplines” (2011: 532). The 
argument is similar to Latour’s descriptions of Pasteur’s interventionist moves. To make an 
academically inappropriate experiment, here is a sentence with the name of the scientist it deals with 
removed: “The social movement into which X inserted himself is a large part of the efficacy attributed 
to X’s demonstrations.” The statement stands true of Zuber’s Mercator (or Biagioli’s Galileo) as it 
does for Latour’s Pasteur. * (And there will be more discussion of Pasteur in Chapter IV.)  
There is a subtler contribution to mapping as well as to our world for which Mercator is 
responsible (albeit far from alone). The late 16th and early 17th century was the moment when the 
“epistemic foundations of maps” as we know them were laid down (Joyce 2003: 35).  
Visuality was central to how abstract space was conceived. […] The abstract, and gendered, 
gaze of the map was literally superior: the view from above was detached, part of a visual 
rhetoric of modernity which privileged the observer with a vantage point separate from the 
observed.  […] The cartographic surveyor, one whose gaze is detached and looking always 
upon its object is a particularly important exemplification of this visual rhetoric (ibid.).  
 
                                                
* As a matter of academic honesty, I am obligated to cite this reference. It is in fact Latour 1988: 28. 
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It is as if Joyce lifted these lines from a reading of Vermeer’s Geographer.  
 
Open sea/open theory 
By the last decade of the 16th century, the Dutch were making regular sea voyages to the East 
Indies. More and more, navigators for these voyages were using maps with the Mercator projection, 
because although it required some learning, for open sea voyages, it was simply more precise (Schilder 
and van Egmond 2011). The advantages of the Portuguese and Spanish, who had been sailing longer, 
were beginning to erode before Dutch efficiency. This was true in general historically, and in map-
making specifically by correcting previous maps, precisely using the Mercator projection: “…and that 
without any shortening or diminution of the countries, though on the Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, 
Sicilian and other sea-charts they are placed three, four and five degrees, and more, outside their true 
position and latitude” (Schilder and van Egmond 2011: 1409). Three or four degrees of imprecision 
might not mean much when traveling, say, from Genoa to Seville; sailing across the Indian Ocean 
with four degrees of imprecision, on the other hand, would be disastrous.  
Sure enough, before the first decade of the 17th century was out, the seafaring baton was passed 
from the Iberian peninsula to the Dutch. We can point to three (related) events to further elaborate 
this point. The capture of a Portuguese ship, Sta. Catarina, off the coast of Singapore in 1603 by the 
Dutch; the chartering of the Dutch East India Company (the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, or 
VOC) later that same year (Zandvliet 2011); and finally, “the first embassy to a European country of 
diplomats from far-away Siam (now Thailand)” in 1608 (the same year Hans Lipperhey applied for a 
patent for the telescope, Chapter II) (Zoomers 2010: 301), an event that signals that the Dutch had a 
different approach in their colonial endeavors to the Portuguese and Spanish.  
Richard Tuck points out that the seizure of the Portuguese ship was most likely just the 
impetus for unification of several smaller companies into the Dutch East India Company. In any case, 
the VOC would go on to dominate trade in this part of the world for the next two centuries (Tuck 
2001: 79-80). The capture of the ship was instantly the stuff of legend: the ship was laden with copper, 
silk, porcelain, and bullion, the value of which was “not far off the total annual expenditure of the 
English government at the time…” (Tuck 2001: 80). If ever there were a metonymy of the changing 
of hands of power and wealth in the colonial theater, the seizure of the Sta. Catarina is it. In addition 
to being an event of enormous impact for European politics of the time, it was in response to this 
event that Hugo Grotius wrote first De Indis (in 1604/5) and then Mare liberum (in 1609), key texts of 
17th century political philosophy.  
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Grotius was only twenty years old when his cousin (as it happens), Jacob van Heemskerk 
(Tuck 2001: 79), captained the Dutch ship that seized the Sta. Catarina; and only twenty-one (in 
October of 1604) when he was invited to write a legal justification for the plunder (Ittersum 2006: 95). 
By the time he was able to write anything, politics had moved on, so his text was never published. 
(The text would only be recovered in the 19th century and be given a different title by the publisher.) 
Grotius was once again invited to write a justification of the seizure in November 1608, during peace 
negotiations with Philip III of Spain (Tuck 2001: 81), and the result was Mare liberum, later incorporated 
into his much larger De iure belli ac pacis. 
Naturally, Grotius could not write a text in which he explicitly defends the stealing of ships, 
and thus makes no mention of the Sta. Catarina, van Heemskerk, or money made from the sale. His 
task was to uncover, so to speak, a rock solid enough to ground the Dutch actions, all the while 
pretending that plundering of Portuguese ships is only one specific instance (not even worth noting) 
that is ostensibly justified by a robust theoretical framework. Indeed, even before he actually begins 
his tract, in the address to the princes and rulers of the world, he gives very general comments about 
right and wrong (Grotius 2004). And he goes on to list all the various ways in which the Portuguese 
do not have the right to dominate the Indian Ocean – ten of the thirteen chapters of The Free Sea refer 
to Portugal in title. 
In so doing, Grotius – dare we say – stumbled upon a few innovations in political theory.† The 
Dutch were justified in their actions because the Portuguese had unfairly barred them from trading 
across the Indian Ocean. The Free Sea focuses so much on the Portuguese because he has to remove 
the justification for their dominance of this body of water, so that he could therefore show that their 
de facto dominance so far has been unjust. This, in turn, would mean that the Dutch were in fact the 
wronged party seeking justice/restitution. Now the reason the Portuguese are not justified, that is, 
unjust, is that their actions do not rest in natural law: they have no right by title of invention, no right 
by title of Pope’s gift, no right by title of possession, no right by prescription or custom (Grotius 2004: 
3-4). The Portuguese offended “against Dutch merchants and their indigenous trading partners” (van 
Ittersum 2006: 29, my emphasis), which were “gross transgressions of natural law, particularly the law 
of inoffensiveness and freedom of trade and navigation” (ibid.). Martine Julia van Ittersum goes on, 
“[t]his was a major innovation in legal theory and practice…” (ibid.). 
                                                
† As a reader, I am not entirely convinced that Grotius is successful in justifying the ship’s seizure; the lateral 
move onto theoretical terrain, however, allows the reader to entirely lose sight of how successful (or not) 
Grotius’ justification of Heemskerk’s actions really is.  
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In the second step, Heemskerk’s action had to be brought into line with this Dutch just 
restitution, lest they be considered mere piracy. In other words, it was not enough to show that the 
Dutch deserved reparations of some kind, but that it was Heemskerk who is allowed to exact them. 
Grotius says, therefore, “…a good man judging it would adjudge liberty of merchandise unto the 
Hollanders and would forbid the Portugals and others who hinder that liberty to do any violence, and 
would command them to restore their losses” (2004: 59). That is to say, because Heemskerk was a 
good man, his act is not the act of a pirate, but of a representative of the injured Dutch. “A private 
individual,” says van Ittersum, “could reclaim these powers [of sovereignty] and exercise them in 
person under certain circumstances…” (2006: 29). These circumstances are the absence of higher 
instantiations of sovereignty, such as judges, military officers, etc. (ibid.).  
The innovation here lay in this flow of sovereignty between an individual and higher powers. 
In justifying the ship captain, Grotius reversed the question of justification: he did not ask who 
authorized Heemskerk to perform this act; rather he established that sovereignty “…derived from the 
Dutch commonwealth or respublica and, more specifically, from each and every Dutch citizen” (ibid.). 
The rhetorical sidestep worked all too well: at least as far as theory went, Grotius rendered the seizure 
of the Sta. Catarina a moot point, opening up a whole new way of thinking about law, sovereignty, and 
politics. 
 
States/myths of nature 
Yet, the framework of the argument required a couple of more new moments. The very nature 
of writing a text like The Free Sea meant distinguishing between things over which there can be 
sovereignty and over which not. Indeed, just as the Dutch were historically establishing their own 
sovereignty of the United Seven Provinces, Grotius would never deny the Portuguese their sovereignty 
over their own land. The open sea, however, was a different matter. One could possess that which one 
could catch in the sea; but not the sea itself. Therefore, it would also not be fair to deny anyone fishing 
in any location of the sea. One could fish wherever, and the caught fish were one’s possession; but 
one could not bar others from fishing (even in the same portion of the sea) and claiming possession 
to their caught fish (Grotius 2004). 
The same applies, says Grotius, to the air and wild lands: they cannot be possessed, but caught 
fowl or wild animals become possessions. What we are presented with here is an idea of nature as a 
bountiful resource. In several places, Grotius mentions that “God himself speaketh this in 
nature…whereof the life of man standeth in need, to be sufficiently ministered by nature…” (2004:10), 
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“[n]ature had given all things to all men…” (2004: 49), “…the common and harmless use of the sea 
is required, which by the law of nature is common unto all…” (2004:59). And in a reply to William 
Welwod’s critique of Mare liberum (Welwod was worried about Dutch fishing off the coast of England), 
Grotius reiterates: “…moreover, because of the fact that it is no one’s property, its fruits may be 
gathered by anyone, as can be shown from the example of herbs and other things growing in lands 
newly discovered” (2004:123). It does not take much to recognize the fiction in which nature is 
considered a resource to be a crucial aspect of the capitalist world, one that would remain with us to 
the present. 
To this fiction, Grotius adds another, one that is also still with us under various guises. The 
story, according to Grotius, goes something like this: “[w]e are to know, therefore, in the first 
beginning of the life of man, dominion was another thing and communion differing from that which 
they are now” (2004: 2) – that is to say, things were different “in the first beginning.” At that time, 
“[b]y the first law of nations, which sometimes also is called natural and which the poets elsewhere 
describe in the golden age…nothing was proper…” (2004: 21) – that is to say, in that first state of 
nature there was no property, everything was common. Indeed, “[i]n this signification, therefore, we 
affirm all things common at that time…” (ibid.). Then, “[p]roperty being found out, there was a law 
set down which should imitate nature.” (2004: 22) Note that the departure from this state of nature 
was followed by establishment of laws, that is, by natural law. Then, “[t]he same time commonwealths 
began to be instituted and established” (2004: 24) – that is to say, countries, groupings of individuals, 
come into being. And, of course, trade: “[b]ut so soon as movable things (necessity which was even 
now declared pointing at it) passed into proper right, permutation was found out, whereby that which 
is wanting unto one should be supplied of that which is superfluous to another” (2004: 50). Just so. 
The two “natural” fictions are intertwined. In the beginning, there was no property and 
everything was common; then, through their labor, men (always men) fished the seas and tilled the 
land, claiming possession of items caught, hunted, grown. All the while, nature’s plenty, ensures both 
that everyone possesses something and that these possessions are rather diverse, which brings about 
trade. And again, the flow of sovereignty from individual to state (or vice versa) means that trading 
individuals are essentially no different to trading companies (groups of individuals) or states. Just as 
individuals are free to exchange possessions, so are states free to conduct trade. Thus, Grotius returns 
us to the (natural) right of the Dutch to trade in the East Indies, and why the Portuguese have no 
(natural) right to bar them from doing so.  
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It is perhaps worth spending a little more time on these notions of nature. If our contemporary 
sensibility finds the notion of ‘nature as resource’ distasteful, we should remember that four hundred 
years ago, humans’ relation to the planet was remarkably different. The notion of ‘overfishing’, for 
example, as we know it, would have seemed ridiculous in the early 17th century. Therefore, Grotius’s 
example of fish being part of the open sea until they are caught seems perfectly reasonable: one could 
no more exhaust the fish in the sea than one could, say, cart away sea water one bucket at a time. Seen 
thus, the idea of nature as a plentiful resource, waiting (willing?) to be transformed by the labor of 
men, is not at all far-fetched. Furthermore, an aspect of this understanding of nature as resource is 
still with us. Namely, if nature is ‘open’ to anyone until it is possessed by someone, it means nature is 
mere matter awaiting the distinction (in both senses of the word) of being possessed by a man; while 
man becomes sovereign conferring ontological status of possession through his labor. It would take 
humanity reaching the actual, physical limits of resources (i.e. overfishing) to question the underlying 
assumptions in this approach to the world. This was something that would not take place until the 
20th century. 
Grotius’ invention of individual sovereignty would be further, and more famously, fleshed out 
by later political thinkers, such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau – but the seeds of the self-interested, 
sovereign individual were already there in 1609. Richard Tuck writes that Hobbes’ “state of nature 
was peopled by agents preoccupied with their own protection, and willing to use any violence 
necessary in order to ensure their survival” (2001: 228). And while he does say that Hobbes’ account 
goes further than Grotius’, they are following the same line of thought. For Grotius – and political 
theorists for at least two centuries thereafter – self-interested entities always concerned with self-
defense. Crucially, companies (like the VOC) were also self-interested entities obsessed with survival, 
as were individual human beings. And this was their natural state. 
In the introduction to Grotius’ three-volume The Rights of War and Peace, Richard Tuck writes: 
Whatever their different views about what he had done, Grotius’s readers in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries were united in their praise for his originality, for in De Iure Belli ac 
Pacis we have indeed found many of the central themes of modern political theory. Grotius’s 
men are born free, under no authority but that which all men will recognize, the authority of 
a minimal kind of natural law. They are equal, for the essence of Grotius’s natural justice (as 
distinct from the distributive justice characteristic of civil societies) is that it treats all men as 
equal and does not recognize distinctions of rank or even of merit; furthermore, in nature our 
property is extremely exiguous, and no one can claim property rights at the expense of the 
poor. And yet, on the other hand, his men are competitive and censorious, eager to conquer 
new territories if that will promote the rational use of the world’s resources, and eager to 
intervene in the internal affairs of other nations if they see injuries being suffered by the 
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innocent. The world Grotius depicted is indeed recognizably our world, for good or ill (Tuck 
2005: xxxiii).  
 
* 
Mercator’s maps and Grotian individuals are still very much with us. Vermeer’s geographer is 
yet taking the measure of our world. 
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Chapter II: The Geographer and His Observational Instruments 
 
Begin with Vermeer’s Geographer. The stunning blue of the robe, the light streaming through 
the window onto the face of the subject and the unfolded paper before him, the richly woven fabric 
casually draped over the table, the nearly invisible yet exquisite white and blue tiles along the bottom 
of the wall—. Beyond mere scopophilic pleasure, the arrangement of the various objects in the 
painting draws the eye, with the light, past the draped cloth, down to the wooden box in the right 
lower corner, then up to the map hung on the wall, then back across towards the globe in middle, and 
back to the window pane. Vermeer is presenting the viewer with the technological marvels of the age: 
the cloth, tiles, maps, globes, and glass – all of it indirect veneration of the figure at the very center of 
the canvas. What, asks the painting, is at the center, the origin, of all this technological wonder? The 
new scientific mind, comes the response.  
By the time Vermeer painted this picture in 1668, the Copernican and Galilean revolution was 
over. Copernicus had published his world-changing book over a hundred years prior, and at this point 
both Kepler and Galileo were already dead (to use them as reference points). And although Isaac 
Newton was yet to burst onto the scene (not for long), a new science had well and truly taken the 
stage. It was, therefore, no accident that Vermeer chose to represent it with a figure of a youngish man 
with no trace of anything religious about him.  
Yet the objects represented in the painting are more than mere satellites of the human, and 
are even related to one another independently of him. On their own (without the young scientist) they 
sing of a novel world. Although it had been nearly two hundred years since Columbus’ initial journey, 
there were regions of the world that were still completely new to 17th century Europeans, in particular 
to Dutch explorers. The Netherlands itself was new in two different ways: its independence from 
Spain was still a novelty and its survival was far from certain at this point. (Indeed, shortly after the 
birth of this painting, the Dutch had their disaster year – Rampjaar – in 1672, very nearly destroying 
the country.) But even more astonishingly, the Netherlands itself was new since the Dutch were 
reclaiming land from the sea: it was quite literally new land. All of this is well represented through the 
globe atop the armoire, the map on the wall, the unfolded paper in front of the scientist, and the 
dividers he holds in his hand. The cloth and window have their own relationship. Both cloth-making 
and glass production were booming in 17th century Delft, where Vermeer lived. Drapers used 
magnifying glasses in the course of their work to assess the quality of the weave, either imported or 
produced locally (Snyder 2015).  
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Unsurprisingly for a painter, Vermeer was looking for a new way to see and render the world 
on canvas. Cloth, maps, glass were all items that had a strong connection with painting at the time, 
because they had a strong connection with ways of seeing (Snyder 2015). According to Laura Snyder’s 
book Eye of the Beholder, Dutch painting prior to the 17th century was done on wood, so canvas as a 
painting material was new (2015). Map-making and painting were a single profession, both sets of 
artists belonging to the same Guild of St. Luke.  
It is, of course, glass-making that interests us most here. More than perhaps anything else, 
glass-making, that is, observation through glass magnification, which drove the new science of the 17th 
century. Starting with Galileo Galilei’s 1610 publication of the Sidereus Nuncius, telescopes and then 
microscopes became the hallmark instrument of the new science. And more than anything else, 
observation became what the scientist did. In fact, in her book, Snyder tells us that the original title of 
Vermeer’s painting was not The Geographer, but The Surveyor (2015: 149); it was only much later that it 
was given its present title. It is only fitting, since surveying, as a word and activity, includes seeing and 
looking (in a way that does not immediately leap to mind with geography). 
 
Observing (in) the 17th century 
Debate rages on about the exact origin or invention of the telescope. Magnifying glasses of 
sorts had been around for centuries even prior to the 1600s (Zuidervaart 2011). Nevertheless, scholars 
agree that the moment the telescope becomes a key scientific instrument comes in 1608 (Van Helden 
2011, Willach 2011). Hans Lipperhey‡ applied for a patent with the States General of Dutch Republic 
for an instrument ‘for seeing far’. (One of the ways which we know that Lipperhey is not the inventor 
of the telescope is that his patent was refused.) From this moment, the telescope undergoes “rapid 
dissemination” (Zuidervaaart 2011: 11) throughout Europe. A mere eighteen months separate that 
initial moment from the publication of Galileo’s Sidereus Nuncius in March 1610. It would be difficult 
to overstate the importance of this instrument to the scientific revolution that took place in the first 
half of the 17th century. 
In Galileo’s Instruments of Credit, Mario Biagioli explains just how central the instrument was to 
Galileo’s career. The telescope allowed him to go “from being a somewhat obscure mathematics 
professor…to becoming a courtly star in Florence…” (2006: 1). Galileo was able to subtly change the 
                                                
‡ In his essay “The ‘true inventor’ of the telescope. A survey of 400 years of debate,” Huib J. Zuidervaart claims 
that Prof. G. Moll added an ‘s’ to Lipperhey’s name, making it Lippershey, an error that remains in English 
publications to this day. I follow Zuidervaart’s spelling (2011). 
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function of the instrument as a social tool in order to advance his career. First, in 1609, he presented 
it to the authorities of the Venetian Republic – to them, Galileo presented it as a military tool, a way 
to see ships on the horizon before they became visible to the naked eye. In return, the Venetians 
increased his professorial salary. Then, he used the telescope to make observations about celestial 
bodies, which he named after the Medici. These observations would become the Sidereus Nuncius and 
would lead to him being given a position of official mathematician to the Medici at the University of 
Pisa (Biagioli 2006).  
However, Galileo knew that there are more discoveries to be made. Therefore, although he 
did describe his instrument in the book, “…the 1610 Nuncius did not provide information to build the 
instrument that was so central to the claims made in the book” (Biagioli 2006: 4). He had to walk a 
very fine line, however, acting as if 
…corroboration of his observations [was] easy, not difficult.  Galileo’s primary worry […] was 
not that some people might reject his claims, but rather that those able to replicate them could 
too easily proceed to make further discoveries on their own and deprive him of future credit. 
He tried to slow down potential replicators to prevent them from becoming competitors. He 
did so by not providing other practitioners access to high-power telescopes and by withholding 
detailed information about how to build them (Biagioli 2006: 79). 
 
Once his position with the Medici was secured, however, his stance changed. It 
allowed him to assume an authoritative, if not arrogant, stance toward those who failed to 
replicate his discoveries. He began to act as if the difficulties some had encountered in seeing 
the satellites of Jupiter did not discredit his discoveries but only confirmed that his telescope 
was the best (Biagioli 2006: 42). 
 
Thus, through subtle changes to the approach and function of the telescope, Galileo ensured 
his own (scientific) rise. The telescope was first a military instrument, then an instrument of discovery 
for the sake of ingratiation, and finally an instrument with which to maintain his scientific authority. 
Cunning, no doubt, on Galileo’s behalf; but only possible because of the Galileo’s social positioning 
of the telescope, that is, the (social, scientific) credit he was able to derive from the instrument (Biagioli 
2006).  
In his reading of Galileo’s credit, Biagioli (tells us in footnote 76 that he) follows the work of 
Latour and Woolgar, specifically from Laboratory Life. Indeed, Biagioli’s description of how Galileo 
inserts the telescope into scientific discourse is reminiscent of Latour’s explanation of Pasteur’s 
interventionist moves. To make an academically inappropriate experiment, here is a sentence with the 
name of the scientist it deals with removed: “The social movement into which X inserted himself is a 
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large part of the efficacy attributed to X’s demonstrations.” The statement stands true of Biagioli’s 
Galileo as it does for Latour’s Pasteur.§ (And there will be more discussion of Pasteur in Part II.)  
Where Latour and Woolgar use the expression “credit as credibility,” Biagioli uses the word 
distance. He sees distance not as some mere (perhaps serendipitous) accident in scientific work, but 
as a crucial constitutive element. He illustrates this with another 17th century example, that of the Royal 
Society.  
Although when founded, it was given a charter by Charles II and counted among its members 
such luminaries as Robert Boyle, Christopher Wren, Robert Hooke, and a little later Isaac Newton, 
Biagioli tells us that the Royal Society 
was a private, voluntary organization with very limited and poorly paid staff. […] The academy 
struggled to secure a significant endowment to support its activities, hire staff, find a building 
to call its corporate home, keep its members interested, maintain a good level of activity at its 
weekly meetings, and make sure that everyone paid his dues. Despite the enthusiasm that 
permeated the first few years of the academy’s life, crisis was just below the surface, and the 
corporate survival of the Society never certain (Biagioli 2006: 46). 
 
(Perhaps it is worth pointing out that a good deal of this precariousness of the Society Biagioli is trying 
to convey could also apply to the whole country of the Netherlands at the time.) Yet, it turns out, we 
owe a lot to this precariousness. Had the Society had stronger standing, it would have perhaps not 
solicited as much work from lesser-known researchers. Indeed, Antoni van Leeuwenhoek, a central 
figure for the present work, is Biagioli’s further evidence. Van Leeuwenhoek was the son of a basket-
weaver, a draper by trade, appointed to a civic position (fairly) early on in his life. It allowed him a 
handsome living, was a steady source of income even in the course of the Rampjaar of 1672 (the 
economic collapse that Vermeer, for example, was unable to weather, plunging into debt), but still left 
him free time to pursue his interests (Snyder 2015). Calling van Leeuwenhoek’s interests hobbies 
would perhaps be unfair, given the zeal, dedication, discipline and sacrifice he gave to them (the word 
obsession is not far out of reach). Yet, he had no scientific training, had little or no grasp of languages 
other than Dutch, crucially being illiterate in Latin, in fact, nothing to recommend him to the scientific 
community of the time, no less the ‘Republic of Letters’ that the Royal Society was weaving across 
Europe. Nevertheless, van Leeuwenhoek became one of the Society’s most prolific (if not the most 
prolific) correspondents. 
                                                
§ As a matter of academic honesty, I am obligated to cite this reference. It is in fact Latour 1988: 28.  
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That a society of ostensibly such high standing would deign to correspond with such a lowly 
figure as van Leeuwenhoek is certainly evidence that such high standing was (in the first part of the 
Society’s existence) mere fiction. Albeit, one which they got away with. On the other hand, it is also a 
most happy circumstance, because while van Leeuwenhoek was not a scientist (perhaps even by 
today’s standards), he was an exceptional observer; so exceptional that his observations were useful 
far beyond bolstering the reputation of a private society in London.  
It is perhaps difficult for us today to conceive of Galileo as an outsider to science, given how 
deeply embedded in its foundations he is. But we should not ignore Biagioli’s introduction to Galileo: 
before the publication of the Sidereus Nuncius, lest we forget, Galileo was “a somewhat obscure 
mathematics professor” (2006: 1). And Biagioli does not even call van Leeuwenhoek a scientist, calling 
him “a microscopist” (2006: 60). Which is not to say that I think Biagioli is wrong. On the contrary, 
it is to point out how novel telescopists and microscopists were in the 17th century. It is to point out 
that the telescope and microscope had to be drawn (dragged, inserted) into science. It is to point out 
that if today telescopes and microscopes seem like perfectly ordinary (which is to say embedded 
within) scientific instruments, that is only because of the work of people like Galileo and van 
Leeuwenhoek (often outsiders). 
 
Microbserving 
While Galileo’s status as mega-star of the scientific world remains inviolate, van Leeuwenhoek 
cuts a more ambiguous figure. He was not quite a scientist, and yet has had an undeniable role in 
science. He was both too early and too late to the game of observing through a microscope. And he 
was too early and too late to the story of microbes. 
As with the telescope, there are no exact origins of the microscope. Reports of a compound 
microscope go as far back as 1595 (by a Dutchman – always a Dutchman! – Hans Jansen) (Croft 
2006). Malpighi, Descartes, Kircher – there is no shortage of great names of the 17th century who 
tinkered with and wrote about microscopes (Bradbury 1967), testifying to how widespread across 
Europe the instrument was, but also how much discovery it potentially promised. Perhaps our best 
reference in that sense is Robert Hooke, whose 1665 Micrographia is a central text in a few ways. The 
book emerged from Hooke’s role as “curator of experiments” to the Royal Society, a position he held 
from 1662. It was popular beyond scientific circles, capturing the imagination of the general public 
(Snyder 2015). In it, Hooke reports his observations of the point of a needle, cloth, sparks, color, 
grains of sand, salt crystals, ice crystals, petrified wood, cork, leaves, mold, moss, sponges, seeds, hair, 
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skin, fish scales, bee stings, fly eyes, insect eggs, but also looking up at stars and the moon. (It was in 
his observation of cork that he first used the word ‘cell’, which would become the unit of life [Hooke 
2005].) Which is to say that, whatever else he was doing, Hooke was showcasing the microscope’s 
potential. Or what he thought was its potential: “by the help of Microscopes, there is nothing so small, 
as to escape our inquiry; hence there is a new visible World discovered to the understanding” (2005: 
5). 
Hooke’s microscopes and his observation were top of the line; his optimism, however, was 
unfounded, because his microscopes were also, unbeknownst to him, the end of the line. 
Development of microscopical observation went on for another fifteen years or so, and then tapered 
off significantly after 1680. “…in the 1680s…the microscope began its alleged century-long “decline” 
within the scientific community, during which comparatively little was written on microscopical 
observation outside the world of fiction” (Needleman Armintor 2009: 195). “The microscope became 
a toy for English ladies and gentlemen. The toy would consist of a microscope and a box of mounted 
specimens from the plant and animal kingdom” (Hacking 1983: 192). Hooke’s work is central to 
microscopy in the sense that it was the apex: before 1665 there was rapid development of observation 
through/with a microscope; after 1680, the microscope would go on scientific hiatus for a couple of 
centuries or so.  
And yet, Antoni van Leeuwenhoek did not get in touch with the Royal Society until 1873. 
Indeed, although he had obsessively been making lenses and observations since the late 1650s (Snyder 
2015), there would have been no reason for the Royal Society to be in touch with him, as he was a 
complete scientific outsider. Once the Society and van Leeuwenhoek were in touch though, it was – 
this is precisely Biagioli’s point – a match made in heaven: for the next fifty years, until literally his 
deathbed, van Leeuwenhoek would write long letters on just about everything under the sun. It is hard 
not to admire van Leeuwenhoek for his indefatigable curiosity, work rate, and discipline. Where 
Hooke reported his eyes hurt using the kind of microscope van Leeuwenhoek designed and built, the 
Dutchman used it all day long. Where Malpighi looked at frog’s blood under the lens, Antoni used his 
own blood, semen, hair, skin, tooth plaque, etc. He taught himself to polish beads of glass to make 
single-lens microscopes, and while we do not know how many he actually made (Snyder says possibly 
as many as 566 [2015: 105]), they were the best in the world for a long time.  
It is fitting that although he wrote an enormous number of letters, van Leeuwenhoek never 
wrote a book of any kind. Snyder attributes this to him never pausing in his observations: “one gets 
the sense of a man in a hurry,” who “did not wish to take time away from making observations” (2105: 
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214). Perhaps that is part of the story; but equally likely is Biagioli’s intuition in calling him a 
‘microscopist’ (and not a scientist). That is to say, van Leeuwenhoek was an excellent technician and 
brilliant observer, but perhaps lacking a theoretical mind that could synthesize what he had been 
seeing. Either way, when the scientific world lost its appetite for observing through a microscope (as 
I said, sometime after 1680), van Leeuwenhoek continued carrying out microscope experiments for 
over forty years. Hooke himself, who had given up observation through microscopes by the late 1670s 
(Snyder 2015), wrote in 1692 that the scientific world was “now reduced almost to a single Votary, 
which is Mr. Leeuwenhoek; besides whom, I hear of none that makes any other Use of that 
Instrument, but for Diversion and Pastime” (quoted in Bradbury 1967: 77).  
To the extent that van Leeuwenhoek was the only person making observations with the 
microscope after scientists had already moved on, he was late to the game. There is a sense, however, 
in which he was also too early with his discoveries. In the fall of 1674, van Leeuwenhoek sent one of 
his letters to the Royal Society in which he mostly discussed the eyeball of a cow. Only towards the 
end does he mention that in a droplet of water, he has been able to observe “little animalcules, whereof 
some were roundish, while others, a bit bigger, consisted of an oval. On these last I saw two little legs 
near the head, and two little fins at the hindmost end of the body” (quoted in Dobell 1932: 110). 
Snyder’s explanation for why this passage was ignored by the fellows of the Society was that 
it was “buried under all the other detailed observation…some of whom may not, indeed, have read 
all the way to the end” (Snyder 2015: 230). This is giving way too much credit to the Royal Society 
members. More likely, they did not read the letter at all; and if they did, only a little of it might have 
been of interest to their own scientific research; and what was of interest to them, certainly did not 
include what must have sounded like – forgive the phrase – complete poppycock. Snyder goes on to 
say that van Leeuwenhoek was rattled and shocked, but offers no evidence of this (2015: 230). The 
reason I think there was no shock or stupefied response from England is that neither van 
Leeuwenhoek nor the fellows of the Society (who bothered to read till the end) really had any idea 
what was observed.  
The point bears some expounding. Van Leeuwenhoek’s discovery of bacteria was indeed 
somewhat different even to Galileo’s discovery that the Moon’s surface is not smooth or that Jupiter 
had moons of its own. In Galileo’s case, although it was new that Jupiter had moons, people of the 
time understood and had seen celestial bodies enough to know what Galileo was describing. The 
moons of Jupiter are just like our own moon, but circling Jupiter, not the Earth (at least in principle). 
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Even if I am oversimplifying, it must be allowed that Galileo’s discovery concerned objects that were 
on the whole familiar.  
In the case of van Leeuwenhoek’s observing bacteria (as we now call them), these were not 
things that were on the whole familiar to scientists. Scientists had peered through the microscope and 
seen parts of animals or organic matter (Hooke looked at bee stings, Malpighi at frog blood), but a 
whole, live, moving, tiny animal would have been utterly unimaginable. Van Leeuwenhoek’s letter was 
from 1674, which is only a year into his correspondence with the Royal Society. The Dutch cloth 
merchant had nowhere near enough credit (to borrow a notion from Biagioli) to convince in a few 
lines members of the Royal Society that he had discovered something never before seen (if, that is, he 
himself understood at this point the magnitude of his observation). That not a single member was 
stirred by this news, nor in fact that van Leeuwenhoek did not mention these little animals again for 
over a year (sic!) – should be a surprise to no one (Dobell 1932).  
It is in October of 1676 – at least two years after the first sighting – that Leeuwenhoek writes 
what Clifford Dobell calls “Letter 18” – “a truly amazing document” (1932: 112). By this point we can 
say, I think, that van Leeuwenhoek wrapped his mind around the significance of the phenomenon. 
The letter, although in Dutch and signed by him, is not in van Leeuwenhoek’s hand (Dobell 1932: 
113), meaning that he thought this epistle important enough to have it written out by someone with a 
more calligraphic hand. Further evidence that van Leeuwenhoek understood the importance of the 
issue is that in November of 1676, he sent a shortened version of “Letter 18,” in Dutch to Constantijn 
Huygens (Dobell 1932). This was unusual for van Leeuwenhoek, since throughout his career he almost 
exclusively corresponded with the Royal Society (Biagioli 2006).  
If the little animals were yet to impress the Society fellows, they did, however, impress 
Oldenburg (to whom the letter was addressed) enough to translate it into English (Dobell 1932). It 
might be worth noting that Oldenburg only translated a portion of the letter. When Clifford Dobell 
wrote Antony van Leeuwenhoek and his “Little Animals” in the 1930s, the entirety of the letter had not yet 
been published in English, and had only been published in Dutch in 1925 (Dobell 1932). When I say 
that van Leeuwenhoek was too early with work, it is in the sense that in the 20th century, science was 
still in part catching up with him. 
The fellows of the Society would only hear the letter (or Oldenburg’s translation) read in 
February of 1677, and it would be published in the Society’s journal Philosophical Transactions in March 
1677.  Here the story becomes reminiscent of our previous Galilean episode. The members of the 
Royal Society asked Leeuwenhoek for information on how to make a microscope with which they 
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could see these little animals – in effect, asking for replication of observation. And much like Galileo 
who divulged little information about his telescope, van Leeuwenhoek simply refused to tell the RS 
how he made his microscopes: “My method for seeing the very smallest animalcule I do not impart 
to others” (quoted in Snyder 2015: 238).  
In response, the RS called up its own great microscopists, Nehemiah Grew and Robert Hooke, 
both of whom, Snyder points out, had begun to lose interest in the microscope by 1677 (2015: 240). 
Nevertheless, mid-November, Hooke was able to replicate the observation and to show it to members 
of the RS: “[there were] great numbers of exceedingly small animals swimming to and fro.… [T]hey 
were near an hundred thousand times less than a mite…They were seen by Mr Henshaw, Sir 
Christopher Wren, Sir John Hoskyns, Sir Jonas Moore, Dr Mapletoft, Mr Hill, Dr Croune, Dr Grew, 
Mr Aubrey, and divers others so that there was no longer any doubt of Mr Leewenhoeck’s discovery” 
(Birch, quoted in Dobell 1932: 185-186). 
Of course, the RS also had an interest in van Leeuwenhoek being right. After all, they had 
accepted (if only through correspondence at that point) into their ranks a person who was now 
claiming to be able to see through a microscope (that no one could reproduce) beings so small that 
“if 100 of them lay stretched out one by another, they would not equal the length of a grain of course 
Sand; and according to this estimate, ten hundred thousand of them could not equal the dimensions 
of a grain of such course Sand” (van Leeuwenhoek, quoted in Snyder 2015: 234). These claims were 
so outrageous that if they had turned out to be wrong, the Royal Society would be subject to major 
embarrassment. As luck would have it, the Delft civil servant really was as good an observer as these 
claims suggested.  
Now, a comparison between Galileo’s and van Leeuwenhoek’s discoveries might be useful. 
Why was Galileo (eventually) placed under house arrest for his scientific claims, while van 
Leeuwenhoek was celebrated? Well, it could be a matter of somewhat different time and place: Italy 
vs. Holland, and first half vs. second half of the 1600s – by the time van Leeuwenhoek is performing 
his observations, the Copernican system had won the day. It could be perhaps that Galileo wrote and 
published in Catholic Italy, whereas van Leeuwenhoek lived in more tolerant, (largely) Protestant 
Delft. But I would like to submit that there is also something else. Galileo was a man of his time: the 
order of the day was disproving Ptolemaic and proving Copernican cosmology. After writing the 
observational Sidereus Nuncius in 1610, Galileo went on to publish more philosophical texts (like the 
Assayer), because he could see (and was forced to deal with) the theoretical consequences of what he 
had ‘merely observed’ earlier.  
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For better or worse, van Leeuwenhoek was never in a position to, as it were, interrogate his 
own theoretical assumptions. After the initial observation came the second, and third, and so on until 
his death. But even more so, beyond pure curiosity, what was the point in looking so closely at a 
droplet of water? Even when van Leeuwenhoek discovered that the animalcules could be found 
everywhere (and it would be really difficult to find something in 17th century Holland that he had not 
looked at through his device), what did that change about scientists’ understanding of the world? Put 
differently, Galileo was timely because he was providing answers to the Copernican challenge at a time 
when they were necessary. In a way, Van Leeuwenhoek is more the Copernicus (not Galileo) figure, 
in that his discovery would revolutionize the world, but the corresponding Galileo figure in this story 
would only come onto the scene in two hundred years (or later).  
 
Does van Leeuwenhoek count? 
Nowhere, perhaps, is the ambivalence of the figure of van Leeuwenhoek more visible than in 
his research on human sperm. He was endlessly curious about the world, including sperm (of sundry 
species); but he was also willing to ignore it out of prudery, finding it unseemly (Snyder 2015). He was 
able to show that sperm came from testicles, and that the human male produced much more sperm 
than was necessary for the generation of a single human – a contemporary point of contention in the 
scientific and theological world; on the other hand, to his dying day he clung to the notion that each 
spermatozoon contained a homunculus, and that this is what created a new human. He wished to 
study human sperm, using himself as subject; but he also wished to remain a pious Christian, writing 
that “[w]hat I investigate is only what, without sinfully defiling myself, remains as a residue of conjugal 
coitus” (quoted in Snyder 2015: 252) – studying human sperm was pure science, but masturbating to 
obtain said sperm was impure morals.  
There is another similarity to Galileo that I would like to point out here. After a series of 
important discoveries in the 1670s, and certainly after he was elected into the RS in 1680, van 
Leeuwenhoek’s reputation and authority grew immensely. He added the ‘van’ to his name (Snyder 
2015) and addressed the members of the RS as his equals (whereas before he was deferential to the 
point of obsequiousness [Biagioli 2006]). Snyder tells us that when in 1699 a French researcher claimed 
to have actually seen the homunculus in human sperm, van Leeuwenhoek wrote to the RS saying that 
in all his observations of human sperm he had never seen anything like the description offered by the 
Frenchman, concluding that it was entirely invented (Snyder 2015: 255). All the while, he still believed 
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in the homunculus theory of generation, he just did not think that anyone would be able to see it, i.e. 
use a microscope to observe better than him.  
His arrogance aside, van Leeuwenhoek’s observations of sperm did allow him to think about 
it in innovative ways. It was his relentlessness of observation that allowed him to notice that all kinds 
of animals had sperm, not only humans: rabbits, dogs, cockroaches, fish, etc. Further, he noticed that 
to a greater or lesser degree, all these produce much more spermatozoa than they do actual animal 
individuals. Reading his letters gives the impression that the various counting and calculation he 
performs of the spermatozoa in different animals was in part a way to express just how small were the 
phenomena he was seeing. In the process, however, he hits upon an interesting notion. Here is a 
passage containing a calculation done towards the end of the letter of 25 April 1679: 
Let us assume that Holland and Westfriesland are 22 miles long and on average 7 miles broad, 
which makes 154 square miles for the area of Holland. The inhabited earth is 13.385 times 
larger than Holland. According to N.N. who has speculated the number of inhabitants of 
Holland, it is inhabited by 1.000.000 human beings, and if we assume that the inhabited part 
of the earth is as densely populated as Holland, though it cannot well be so inhabited, the 
inhabited earth being 13.385 times larger than Holland yields 13.385.000.000 human beings 
on earth (van Leeuwenhoek, 1948). 
 
The phrase “though it cannot well be so inhabited” tells us that he knew that the number at the end 
is not the actual population of the Earth. He is high-balling the number. He says: “I will now calculate 
(but very roughly) the number of human being on the earth” (van Leeuwenhoek, 1948) But this 
calculation follows the one in which he informs us that (by his calculation), there are “150.000.000.000 
little animals in the milt of cod” (van Leeuwenhoek, 1948). And when he finishes his calculation of 
the number of humans, he finishes the letter by referring once again to cod sperm: “The little animals 
in the milt number 150.000.000.000, which means more than ten animals in the milt of a cod as against 
one human being on the earth’s surface” (van Leeuwenhoek, 1948). 
In the essay “How Many People Can the Earth Support?,” based on his eponymous 1995 
book, Joel E. Cohen says that van Leeuwenhoek “wrote down what may be the first estimate of the 
maximum number of people the earth can support” (1999: 330). This, I would like to argue is both 
true and untrue. I think that van Leeuwenhoek’s main goal with the calculation of the number of 
humans was rhetorical: he was trying to emphasize how many of these little animals there were in cod 
milt. As if to say to his reader: imagine if all the lands were as densely populated as Holland; that would 
still be only a tenth of how many animals in fish semen. In that sense, he is not even providing a 
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realistic estimate (hence “but very roughly”) of how many humans there are, no less one of how many 
there could be. In that sense, Cohen’s use of van Leeuwenhoek is tendentious. 
However, van Leeuwenhoek’s choice of comparison, seems to me, to beg for a second look. 
First, there are surely any number of comparisons he could have made that would have been just as 
effective and perhaps even less laborious. Second, it was not clear to scientists at the time what the 
relation was between sperm and reproduction, that is, between spermatozoa and actual human 
individuals. By comparing cod milt with human numbers, van Leeuwenhoek placed sperm (the 
familiar substance), spermatozoa (the little animals he observed), and actual individuals into the same 
theoretical framework, as if to say, these are related.  Once we set aside the causality between sperm 
and individuals (of which they were not entirely aware), this relation can go both ways: just as a rough 
calculation of the number of humans could illustrate the number and size of spermatozoa, the 
spermatozoa are a variable in counting humans.  
In that sense, Cohen’s statement is true. Van Leeuwenhoek really was thinking about this 
problem demographically (and was probably the first to do so). The way he calculates the number 
involves an aspect of reproduction (sperm) and available resources (land). Are these not, mutatis 
mutandis, the variables employed in demographics: number of humans born/dying, and resources 
necessary to sustain them? Van Leeuwenhoek’s variables are perhaps rudimentary and his result is 
obviously incorrect, but the theoretical framework seems to me spot on. A little further in his essay, 
Cohen says “[f]or several years I have been trying to understand the question, ‘How many people can 
the earth support?’ and answers to it.” Is it too far-fetched to say that he is playing three hundred year 
catch-up with Antoni van Leeuwenhoek? 
* 
Galileo’s telescope and van Leeuwenhoek’s microscope are still very much with us. Vermeer’s 
geographer is yet taking the measure of our world. 
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Chapter III: Populations 
 
Let us stay for just another moment with van Leeuwenhoek’s intuition and estimate of the 
number of people in the world, which he based on extrapolation of the size and population of the 
Netherlands. In using this method of calculation, he brought into the framework of thinking one other 
crucial aspect for political thinkers from the late 17th century onwards: land. Where Grotius was 
primarily concerned with the open sea – little wonder given the style of Dutch colonialism – John 
Locke would elaborate issues relating to land use. This too should not be surprising, given that Locke 
is writing at a time of rapid expansion of English colonies, mostly in America. Indeed, Locke was 
intimately involved in these endeavors, helping to write the charter of Carolina (Tuck 2001). 
Grotius’ sovereign individual was rather useful to Locke, in that if an individual was sovereign 
he could colonize, defend his colony, and punish those who would transgress against it. Just as Grotius 
had Heemskerk’s actions in mind, so was Locke concerned with what the colonizers of America could 
and could not do against the Native American population. Unsurprisingly, in this relationship, the 
Europeans had Lockian natural law on their side. There were other ways in which Locke adopted 
Grotius to his own ends. He took Grotius’ account of possessing caught fish to tease out a logic of 
possession (and ownership). One possessed or owned something if one invested one’s labor into it. 
The sea and the fish in their ‘natural state’ were indeed no one’s and anyone’s; and fish indeed became 
the possession of one who caught the fish; what made the fish his who caught it was the labor of 
fishing. This seemingly banal point, when applied to questions of land, had massive ramifications.  
As far as the English colonists were concerned, the vast spaces of wilderness they encountered 
in North America were vacant. That the Native Americans had or could have a different understanding 
of space and place did not enter their way of thinking. To them, these were open lands, waiting to be 
worked. And he who worked a piece of land came to possess and then own it. Locke was merely 
taking the next step in Grotian thinking. Without wishing to diminish the catastrophe this approach 
wrought upon the Native Americans, Tuck does point out that there had been a famine in England in 
1623, that the colonists could not have known that this was to be the last famine in England, and that 
they were coming over to North America poor, hungry, and desperate. From their perspective, it really 
would have seemed unjust to deprive them of the fruits of the labor they had put in cultivating the 
land (Tuck 2001).  
If van Leeuwenhoek provided the notion of thinking in terms of population, and Grotius 
provided the notion of plentiful nature and the sovereign individual, Locke would add himself to the 
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picture by adding labor. Various thinkers combined these elements in various ways (and to various 
ends), but they remain constant in their writings. There was, I think, another connection between 
these notions. Namely, once Grotius (and Hobbes, and Locke, and…) made the individual sovereign, 
the individual mattered in a way he had not before. It therefore mattered how many individuals there 
were. This meant counting and thinking of humans in terms of numbers – but there was a twist.  
 
(In)human populations 
There is an irony to this endeavor of counting of humans. Reading 18th and 19th century 
demographic writings one is struck just how little humans count. Locke opens “An Essay on the Poor 
Law” from 1697 with the observation (and ostensible consternation) that “the multiplying of the 
poor…is so general an observation and complaint it cannot be doubted of” (1997: 183). On the next 
page, he offers prompt diagnosis: the “growth of the poor must therefore have some other cause, and 
it can be nothing else but the relaxation of discipline and corruption of manners…” (1997: 184). The 
poor and idle are themselves guilty for their condition and the burden they are to society. He goes on 
to say: 
Supposing, then, there be 100,000 poor in England, that live upon the parish, that is, who are 
maintained by other people’s labour (for so is everyone who lives upon alms without working), 
if care were taken that every one of those, by some labour in the woolen or other manufacture, 
should earn but 1d per diem (which, one with another, they might well do, and more), this 
would gain to England £130,000 per annum, which, in eight years, would make England above 
a million of pounds richer (1997: 189). 
 
We have here the full force of Locke’s population thinking: there is the population estimate, 
the analysis of their poverty (that is, living on other people’s labor), and quick economic calculation 
of potential revenue lost. It is worth lingering over the passage to point out the importance of labor 
for Locke the economist. Labor is the solution to those idle, that much is explicit. But he also places 
the notion of labor into the realm of social and economic nature. That is to say, labor is simply present: 
if one is not performing labor, they are “maintained by other people’s” labor. And crucially, framed 
thus, labor reduces human beings themselves to a resource. If labor is merely present, performed by 
all or by some on behalf of all, then it becomes something that the country’s government ought to 
figure out how to make use of. In a move mirroring the colonist famer, (human) labor becomes the 
plentiful natural resource that the government will through its own labor (coercion?) turn into 
something useful. The more they were counted, in other words, the less humans actually counted. 
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I would like to briefly offer a counter-example, only to prove my point about the general 
tendencies of 18th century thinking on this issue. Jonathan Swift’s 1729 essay, A Modest Proposal is read 
above all as supreme satire, and only secondly as a political pamphlet, one answering only a current 
political topic at that. Namely, the text is seen as a remarkable example of a writer’s power to galvanize 
resistance against a specific political event, i.e. William Woods’ proposed halfpence scheme for Ireland 
(Damrosch 2013: 366). But I think that George Wittkowsky’s essay “Biography of an Early Georgian 
Pamphlet” was right to look past the excellent literary qualities and the daily politics, to consider Swift 
tackling the same issue as Locke’s essay on the poor law (Wittkowsky 1943). 
Swift opens in a similar tone to Locke: “I think it is agreed by all parties, that this prodigious 
number of [destitute] children in the arms, or on the backs, or at the heels of their mothers, and 
frequently of their fathers, is in the present deplorable state of the kingdom, a very great additional 
grievance” (1973: 502-3). And continues in the same scientific yet concerned tone:  
As to my own part, having turned my thoughts for many years, upon this important subject, 
and maturely weighed the several schemes of our projectors, I have always found them grossly 
mistaken in their computation. …I propose to provide for [the children] in such a manner, as, 
instead of being a charge upon their parents, or the parish, or wanting food and raiment for 
the rest of their lives, they shall, on the contrary, contribute to the feeding, and partly to the 
cloathing of many thousands” (1973: 503) 
 
Famously, the “feeding, and partly to the cloathing” that the children will contribute is in fact 
their own flesh and skin. The children in Swift’s essay are turned into a mere resource that can 
potentially be turned into something useful (such as “admirable gloves for ladies, and summer boots 
for fine gentlemen” [1973: 505]). Gruesome detail aside, Swift is following Locke’s blueprint, 
estimating the number of souls in Ireland (at one million); calculating the cost of maintaining the 
‘commodity’ (at ten shillings a piece per year); and calculating its market value (at eight shillings 
sterling)…  
Twice in his essay Swift refers to an American acquaintance, assuring the reader that such 
treatment of babies was perfectly common the other side of the ocean. A clever ploy to add a modicum 
of believability and help along a credulous Irish readership, no doubt. On the other hand, there is no 
reason not to think that Swift chose his exotic example carefully, perhaps cognizant of the 
pervasiveness of equating every aspect of America with the notion of resource. After all, what was 
America to the Europeans at the time? And what the colonists for Locke, other than labor/resource? 
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Doubling populations 
Only about twenty years after Swift wrote his satirical essay, a very important American did 
indeed write a short piece that dealt with these issues. Entitled “Observations Concerning the Increase 
of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, etc.,” it was written in 1751, when America was still part of the 
British Empire. Although American, the author, Benjamin Franklin (who sometimes signed his letters 
as “Americanus), at this point still referred to Britain as the “mother country” (Franklin 1936). The 
text contains no slaughter of babies in the way Swift’s essay envisaged, but it features a horror all its 
own and typically American. Namely, it is permeated by what the modern reader cannot help but 
perceive as blatant racism, lamenting the “darkening of superior beings” (Franklin 1936: 402), as well 
as that there are so few “purely white people in the world” (1936: 401). (While he does not elaborate, 
it is still disturbing to read the words he uses for skin complexion: “black,” “tawny,” “swarthy” 
[Franklin 1936].) When discussing slavery, Franklin talks only about the cost of slave labor compared 
to wage labor (and perhaps surprisingly claiming that holding slaves is more expensive) – with no hint 
of recognition of ethical difference between the two.   
Nevertheless, racism aside, Franklin’s essay, I think, shifts the debate in a couple of important 
ways. Just like Locke and Swift, Franklin begins his essay with births and deaths, that is, with numbers 
of humans, moving on to land, money, labor. But both Locke and Swift estimate given populations: 
“supposing, then, there be 100,000 poor in England…” (Locke 1997: 189) and “there being a round 
million of creatures in humane figure throughout this kingdom…” (Swift 1973: 509). Franklin 
introduces the process of populating: “[t]hus there are suppos’d to be now upwards of One Million 
English Souls in North America, (tho’ ‘tis thought scarce 80,000 have been brought over sea)” (Franklin 
1936: 401 emphasis in the original). However, as opposed to merely counting, Franklin’s number 
reflects the result of growth. And he goes on triumphantly: 
This million doubling, suppose but once in twenty-five years, will in another century be more 
than the people of England, and the greatest Number of Englishmen will be on this side the 
water. What an accession of Power to the British Empire by the Sea as well as Land! What 
increase of trade and navigation! What numbers of ships and seamen! We have been here but 
little more than one hundred years, and yet the force of our Privateers in the late war, united, 
was greater, both in men and guns, than that of the whole British Navy in Queen Elizabeth’s 
time (ibid.). 
 
Leaving aside the triumphalist tone and whether he is in fact correct in his estimates, and even the 
amusing fact that one of the founding fathers of American independence was so rabidly pro-British 
twenty-five years (one cycle of a million people!) before the revolution – the novelty here is Franklin’s 
projection.  
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Franklin’s projection seems unimpeded by any resource constraint. Whether he was 
deliberately limiting himself to “another century,” or whether he took seriously the idea that “…so 
vast is the Territory of North America, that it will require many ages to settle it fully…” (1936: 396), 
or even perhaps simply a reflection of his general optimism, the essay does not envisage any obstacles 
to this growth of doubling every twenty-five years. Be that as it may, what is important for us here is 
the notion of projection of population. 
Franklin’s other departure from Locke and Swift is perhaps a little more subtle. Franklin wrote 
about the country in which he lived in organic, natural terms. Britain was the mother country, and he 
reminds (presumably the politicians in Britain) that “…weakening the children [the colonies] weakens 
the whole family” (ibid.). A little later, his racism acquires a naturalistic metaphor (sounding 
depressingly contemporary): “why should the Palatine Boors [Germans] be suffered to swarm into our 
settlements, and by herding together establish their languages and manners to the exclusion of ours?” 
(1936: 401). Perhaps anachronistic, but it is difficult for the modern reader not to be appalled by such 
words as “swarm” and phrases as “herd together.” 
The passage in which his notion of a country assumes the most organic from is worth quoting 
in full: 
A Nation well regulated is like a Polypus; take away a Limb, its Place is soon supply’d; cut it 
in two, and each deficient Part shall speedily grow out of the Part remaining. Thus if you have 
Room and Subsistence enough, as you may by dividing, make ten Polypes out of one, you may 
of one make ten Nations, equally populous and powerful; or rather, increase a Nation ten fold 
in Numbers and Strength (Franklin 1936: 401).  
 
Would it be going too far to suggest that perhaps this passage shows a glimpse of an idea bubbling up 
from the back of Franklin’s mind: that an America independent from its ‘mother country’ would be 
just as strong? Certainly, it shows Franklin’s optimism, at which it is difficult to be surprised, given 
American land expansion and development in the 18th century. 
What is interesting for us here are the words ‘powerful’ and ‘strength’. The way they are used 
here is synonymous with wealth and health. Franklin would not have been the first to associate the 
terms wealth and health in regards to measuring the quality or power of a nation, but an organic 
analogy, such as the one he uses, only tightens the connection.  
By the century’s end, however, these elements would once again recombine. Nearly fifty years 
and three (different) revolutions separate Franklin’s essay from that of Thomas Robert Malthus’ An 
Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus 1998). The first was the American Revolution, in which the 
colonies successfully rebelled against – to throw Franklin’s words back at him – the mother country; 
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the second was the French Revolution, which understandably terrified the upper echelons of English 
society, and to which Malthus explicitly refers at the beginning of his essay (1998: 1); and third, the 
industrial revolution. 
 
Population trouble 
It is abundantly clear from Malthus’ essay that he is quite concerned about the poor; it is also 
clear that his concern comes from a very different place to that of John Locke. Locke wrote of the 
multiplying poor in (literally) the same sentence as the increased tax necessary to maintain them, i.e. 
as an economic burden. He had no compunction when referring to this problem as the “evil…upon 
us” (1997: 183). Indeed, Swift’s satire is in part possible precisely because of the disdain Locke (and 
others at the time) showed towards the poor. The American and in particular the French revolution 
taught the English intellectuals that there was a whole other, much less passive and pleasant side to 
the poor. If Malthus’ essay feels like it is delivering an urgent message, it is because he is aware that he 
is writing on the cusp of a population explosion – the second word dangerously approaching its literal 
meaning. 
However, although the urgency and trepidation before the populace has a distinct post-terror 
flavor and thus testifies to the moment of writing, the novelty in Malthus’ thinking lies elsewhere. 
From when Grotius formulated the principle of the free sea at the beginning of the 17th century, a 
constant in the writings of political philosophers had been the abundance of resources. These were 
the fish that according to Grotius anyone could catch; these were the lands that Franklin thought have 
yet to be tilled in America; and Malthus himself quotes William Godwin in saying that the Earth will 
be able to sustain an increase in population for centuries to come. 
If Godwin’s utopian views sound fanciful to our contemporary ears, it is certainly in part 
because, whatever else is said of him, Malthus and his way of thinking have become so deeply 
embedded in our own. Malthus’ break with two centuries of tradition can be described in one phrase: 
resources are finite. Malthus makes his famous claim at the beginning of his essay: “…the power of 
population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man. 
Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an 
arithmetical ratio” (1998: 4).  
With Malthus’ erasure of the notion of abundance of nature, gone also are Godwin’s and 
Franklin’s boundless optimism. But more importantly, Malthus thus explicitly formulated a framework 
in which people and populations are locked in a struggle for resources, meaning for survival. He even 
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goes so far as to say that it has nothing to do with greed or the riches in the hands of the few. The 
battle for resources is such that some must always lose out: 
A collection from the rich of eighteen shillings in the pound, even if distributed in the most 
judicious manner, would have a little the same effect as that resulting from the supposition I 
have just made, and no possible contributions or sacrifices of the rich, particularly in money, 
could for any time prevent the recurrence of distress among the lower members of society, 
whoever they were. Great changes might, indeed, be made. The rich might become poor, and 
some of the poor rich, but a part of the society must necessarily feel a difficulty of living, and 
this difficulty will naturally fall on the least fortunate members (Malthus 1998: 25). 
 
And although he does soften his pessimism by discussing possible checks on population growth 
(negative ones, like war and pestilence, and positive ones, such as having fewer children through 
abstinence), he ultimately remains rather negative in his projections: resources are limited and 
therefore some will always be poor. 
Malthus draws from Locke that maintaining the idle poor is an expensive problem, labor being 
a solution (in Malthus’ case partial). He draws from Franklin the notion of population projection (he 
refers several times in his essay to the doubling of the population every twenty-five years in America 
and contrasts it with English growth), albeit with completely different results.  
Perhaps it is worth emphasizing here that these were Malthus’ projections, that is to say, his 
scenarios are no more imaginary than those of William Godwin. In the above quote, he seems to 
depart from empirical data (“eighteen shillings to the pound”), but quickly devolves into guess work 
(however thought through) when he says that this “would have a little the same effect” and “will 
naturally fall on the least fortunate.” Nevertheless, Malthusian ‘fancy’ has remained with us ever since 
in a number of ways. 
In 1800, the British government conducted its first census. A hundred and twenty years after 
van Leeuwenhoek estimated the population of the Earth, the world was finally ready to start thinking 
demographically. Populations (were) counted. Two aspects were significant in the counting: fertility and 
resources. For van Leeuwenhoek, the first could be derived from the number of spermatozoa he could 
see under his microscope; for Malthus, it was “the passion between the sexes” (1998: 4). Resources 
for van Leeuwenhoek was the land of Holland (which he estimated at 1/13,385th of Earth’s total land 
mass); for Malthus, it was “that food was necessary to the existence of man” (ibid.) 
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Malthusian shadows 
Malthusian thinking is still with us in discussing environmental problems we face. When 
Robert Kunzig, senior environment editor of the National Geographic, asks in the subheading of his 
article “[b]y 2045 global population is projected to reach nine billion. Can the planet take the strain?” 
(Kunzig 2011), he is asking Malthus’ question. More important still, however, is how Malthus’ thinking 
has transferred into our thinking about the natural world. 
If the phrase “locked in a struggle for resources and survival” sounded familiar, it is because 
this notion was adopted by Charles Darwin. Darwin was convinced of (as he called it) the 
‘transmutation’ of species from at least the time The Beagle returned to England in 1838. Being the 
consummate scientist, he refused to go public with his idea until he had a mechanism for this 
transmutation. That mechanism is what he called ‘natural selection’. Lest we forget, the full title of 
Darwin’s great book is On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life (1859). Here is Darwin at the beginning of his book: 
In the next chapter the struggle for existence among all organic beings throughout the world, 
which inevitably follows from the high geometrical ratio of their increase, will be considered. 
This is the doctrine of Malthus, applied to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms. As many 
more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, 
there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however 
slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying 
conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be NATURALLY 
SELECTED (1859: 4, emphasis in the original). 
 
Darwin’s son, Francis, put together two volumes of ‘life and letters’, in which Charles Darwin confirms 
the inspiration received from Malthus: 
In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened 
to read for amusement ‘Malthus on Population,’ and being well prepared to appreciate the 
struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of the 
habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable 
variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of 
this would be the formation of new species. Here then I had at last got a theory by which to 
work… (2008: 55). 
 
In other words, as theory, Malthus’ principles were successfully applied beyond their author’s wildest 
dreams; just not in the field for which he designed them.  
A few words of commentary are in order. We should, first of all, not underestimate the order 
of Darwin’s ‘discoveries’. Darwin ‘happened to read [Malthus] for amusement’ at a time when he was 
a) already convinced of evolution, and b) when he was deep into his ‘systematic enquiry’. That is to 
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say that this mechanism of natural selection did not enter an unbiased mind, rather one that had been 
groping around for an explanatory procedure for something it already considered true. Second, the 
success of evolutionary theory by natural selection lent itself to their equation, that is to say, reduction 
of one to the other, theory to its mechanism, which is what happened when Herbert Spencer coined 
the phrase ‘survival of the fittest’.  
Moreover, in what must rank as one of the most stunning examples of indiscriminate field 
jumping, Malthusian theory of population was given a new lease on life. What was a fanciful idea in 
1798 (two years before the first census, that is, when Britain started keeping official data on 
population!) became iron clad natural law when it was transposed into biology some sixty years later. 
For his part, Malthus was mining a tradition of political theory that went back (at least) to Grotius: a 
self-interested, sovereign individual was locked in a battle with other self-interested, sovereign 
individuals. If for Grotius this did not mean outright war, that was not because these sovereign 
individuals were not by nature bellicose, but because nature provided enough for everyone such that 
war was unnecessary. As soon as Malthus applied his own maxim, ‘resources are finite’, that same 
individual now became inextricably mired in an endless state of war. Whatever the case regarding 
resources, the sovereign individual survived over two hundred years of political theory and was 
rewarded for it by emerging into the science of biology.  
If subsequent theorists – from the aforementioned Herbert Spencer and Darwin’s cousin 
Francis Galton, through Julian Huxley all the way to E. O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins – found it 
easy to shift between evolutionary theory and social theory, ostensibly applying the principles of the 
former to understand the latter, is it not precisely because the founding theory of biology had so 
heavily imbibed from a very social theory? 
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Chapter IV: Purity 
 
Let us return briefly not to the figure of Malthus that infiltrated biology, but to Malthus the 
political scientist. His idea of finite resources ultimately derives from the very strong link between land 
and resources. In this respect, Malthus was in good company. Franklin, Godwin, Smith, and later 
David Ricardo would all present strong connections between wealth/resources and land. (Again, if 
their ultimate results varied, it was because they were not in agreement about the ultimate amount of 
available land.) The historian E. A. Wrigley calls these economies “organic” (2004: 246). He points 
out that  
Land was a necessary factor in all forms of material production to a degree not easily 
recognised in a post-industrial revolution setting. Almost all raw materials were either 
vegetable or animal: even where mineral raw materials were employed, they were capable of 
conversion into a useful form only by burning a vegetable fuel (Wrigley 2004: 244). 
 
However, by the 1830s, massive changes were afoot. Again, Wrigley, with a critique of Malthus 
and others: 
Malthus, in common with the other classical economists, failed to foresee the extravagant 
possibilities for growth represented by a world in which the fact that land was in fixed supply would 
cease to have any serious relevance to the possibilities of expanding output […] But, though with the benefit 
of hindsight we can detect evidence of the slow conversion of the English economy to a new 
mode of operation in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, later christened the 
industrial revolution, Malthus remained unaware of the sea change in progress about him, even 
at the end of his life in the early 1830s (2004: 246, my emphasis) 
 
The economic onus was rapidly shifting from land/agriculture to towns/industry (Hopkins 2000, 
Wrigley 2004).  
 
The diseased city 
Yet, even though land was losing its economic importance, it retained (even strengthened) its 
ideological significance as that which stood in contrast to urban filth. City squalor would be a common 
refrain throughout the 19th century (as we shall see), but it was well grounded in previous theories. 
Even in his 1798 essay Malthus thought that “[t]he unwholesomeness of towns, to which some 
persons are necessarily driven from the nature of their trades, must be considered as a species of 
misery…” (1998: 34). This was even before the great expansion of British cities that took place in the 
19th century. Eric Hopkins tells us that already around the time of Malthus’ death in 1834, towns 
around the country “were faced with great problems of housing, water supply, sanitation and drainage, 
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as multitudes of newcomers poured in from the countryside. […] the standard of life in them was 
causing increasing concern (‘a mean and groveling mode of existence’, one observer called it)” 
(Hopkins 2000: 7). 
It is important to point out that there are two sides to this urban story: one is indeed the urban 
filth and horrible living conditions of the burgeoning British working class; the other is how the 
intellectual elite framed these issues as both the fault of those who suffered in these circumstances, 
i.e. the poor, and also explicitly as their moral failings. The first is a consequence of the growth of 
cities beyond what anyone had ever seen before. The second mined a long theoretical tradition that 
went back at least a quarter of a millennium, to Locke and William Petty, of disdain and disgust with 
the poor. Frank Mort tells both sides of this story wonderfully in Dangerous Sexualities. Medico-moral 
politics in England since 1830 (2000).  
Following Mort, our story of populations shifts right around the time of Malthus’ death to 
cities and to a slightly different agent: cholera. There were instances of the disease in the 1820s, but it 
takes center stage when the first epidemic hits England in 1831 (Mort 2000). It would remain a 
constant presence on the social scene for the duration of the 19th century (with big epidemics in 1848-
9, 1853-4 and 1866 [ibid.]).  
That the disease is sometimes known (still to this day) as Asiatic cholera is a hint about the 
significance of the disease in the story of (English) colonialism and its reverberations back home; that 
the first epidemic coincides with the expansion of industry and urban population is crucial for thinking 
about the nature of disease (that is to say, that it is above all a social ill); that it would primarily strike 
the poor but be instrumentalized by the elites in their stronghold of power is fascinating. The case of 
cholera was also perhaps the first modern example of a tension between the (ostensibly) guaranteed 
freedom of the individual to live one’s life how one chooses, and the sovereign right of a 
country/community to protect itself. (In other words, the contemporary debate regarding vaccines 
and whether governments should have the right to coerce parents to vaccinate their children can 
already be read in the issue of cholera in 19th century Britain.) 
 
What can doctors do? 
Immediately upon the first epidemic, the medical community (for lack of a better word) issued 
its response. In 1832, James Kay published a pamphlet entitled “The Moral and Physical Condition 
of the Working Classes Employed in the Cotton Manufacture in Manchester” (Mort 2000). It is 
important to note a couple of things about the figure of James Kay. He was a doctor who came from 
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a family whose money was in cotton, printing, blacking (ibid.) – that is to say, not in land, but rather 
industries on the rise. His perspective on the issue of the poor suffering from cholera was not a matter 
of pure altruism; rather, Kay and other industrialists were afraid that the disease would decimate their 
workers. “Mine owners in the north east petitioned for increased state intervention, not on 
humanitarian grounds but to alleviate losses to capital” (Mort 2000: 14). Further, Kay’s ideas about 
being a doctor belonged very much to his own time in that this profession conferred a duty of social 
involvement, i.e. being politically active. “…[L]ike Wakley he [Kay] saw no division between medical 
inquiry and politics” (ibid.: 15). That is, it was not just that Kay was a doctor and a politician (or social 
reformer), the two roles were really one: he was a politician whose politicking was conducted through 
medicine, and he was a doctor whose specialty was public health. Medicine, thus, far from being some 
neutral and altruistic science, was a tool in the hands of a specific political group. 
That group is worth one more comment. Mort points out that at the time when Kay is writing 
his pamphlet, doctors and medicine are not yet part of the elite circle of professions. Here is Mort: 
The exact position of the local doctor, in terms of class and professional status, remained 
economically and culturally ambiguous until well into the mid-nineteenth century. He was 
caught between the trade origins of the barber-surgeons and the superior ranking of lawyers 
and barristers. Many came from relatively humble origins, like Wakley, the son of a west 
country farmer and William Farr, a central figure at the General Register Office, who was from 
a family of agricultural labourers (2000: 21-2). 
 
(We can also include here John Snow, whose father was a lowly laborer and farmer.) This adds another 
dimension to the high school textbook story of doctors and hygienists working to stamp out cholera: 
the work of these activists is perhaps better described (to borrow a phrase from Latour) as “politics 
by other means” (1988: 142).  
Actually, there were two sets of ‘politics’ through medicine taking place. One was the kind of 
politics just described, dealing with the poor, and (broadly) the subject of Mort’s book. For this 
politics, cholera was used to discipline workers. It was necessary, therefore, to establish a strong 
connection between illness and morality, that is, that the disease is the result of improper living. By 
extension, squalor of living quarters and poor physical development (Malthus’ “species of misery”) 
was seen as the moral failing of the urban working class.  
The second politics was jostling among the elites for belonging, control, status. Cholera in this 
case was an instrument to force one’s way among the political elites. Twice Mort tells us of doctors’ 
furious reactions to solutions that excluded them. In 1832, Thomas Wakely was outraged since the 
“new board…was yet another illustration of the way the profession was being led by drones, 
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sycophants and titled imbecility, most of whom had no personal experience of treating disease, nor 
any understanding of how infection was transmitted” (ibid.: 14). Never mind that doctors themselves 
had little experience treating the disease (given that it was new), and nearly no idea (it turns out) how 
infection was transmitted. And then again in 1848, when a committee was set up: “Almost immediately 
there were familiar cries of outrage from medics over what they saw as their wilful exclusion from the 
new board. It was deeply insulting, they complained, to set up a ‘medical board of two noblemen who 
are perfectly innocent of medical information and a lawyer’” (ibid.: 27). But the doctors too were 
“perfectly innocent of medical information,” since “as late as 1853 the Lancet comically listed the 
range of competing explanations: ‘Is it a fungus, an insect, a miasma, an electrical disturbance, a 
deficiency of ozone, a morbid off-scouring from the intestinal canal? We know nothing; we are at sea 
in a whirlpool of conjecture’” (ibid.: 22). 
The English doctors did not like the germ theory of disease because that would mean that the 
cleanliness and moral standing of an ill person had nothing to do with the disease; that the agent of 
disease lay elsewhere. “It was,” says Mort, “the ‘atmospheric’ or ‘miasmatic’ approach which was 
favoured” (ibid.). If Mort is right in his analysis, though, something rather remarkable follows: at least 
part of the reason medics favored a specific scientific theory is that this theory allowed them to retain 
power. These doctors were not interested in the truth as such; they were interested in the truth insofar 
as it allowed them to hold a powerful position in society. For it was also true that better living 
conditions, sanitation, nutrition, etc. lowered the incidents of disease and death, and yet in the course 
of an entire century, British doctors would not find the true cause of the illness. The “truth” of the 
“‘miasmatic’ approach,” allowed them exercise of power, that is, move forward with hygiene and 
sanitation projects (which they were angry to be left out from); it also allowed them to continue to 
blame the values and behavior of poor people for the conditions they lived in and diseases they 
contracted. It is, I think, no coincidence that germ theory would be rejected in England and would 
have to be developed on the continent: the miasma theory was more convenient.  
This ‘high wire’ act stood true even of those doctors who sought the cause of cholera not in 
miasma, but in water. Consider John Snow: well-known (even to English school children) as the man 
who disabled a water pump (which is now a tourist attraction in London). Yet Snow did not discover 
or theorize the cause of cholera, rather, its modes of communication. Like Kay, Snow offered an 
approach that did not explain the disease, but allowed the doctor to have power by inserting himself. 
Power here refers to the right to remove the pump handle, but also the right to tell people what not 
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to drink, where not to dump their waste (in the Thames) or tell the water company not to draw water 
from a certain portion of the river. 
Snow is further illustrative for our story, because he was at the forefront of thinking about the 
problem spatially. In addition to statistics and demographics, as the new disciplines used to 
‘understand’ this burgeoning new world, the English doctors/hygienists/reforms pioneered the use 
of maps. The banal, but not uninteresting, reason for the proliferation of maps was that cities were 
growing and changing so quickly in the 19th century that maps became an obvious tool (Joyce 2003). 
The reason maps were interesting to people like Snow, Kay, and Edwin Chadwick was that the diseases 
they were facing had an inevitable spatial component: they were not to be found on a single body, but 
on entire groups of people, in neighborhoods, that is, on the body of the city. 
I have already quoted Patrick Joyce in Chapter I saying that maps were essential to power and 
governance. His book, The Rule of Freedom. Liberalism and the Modern City is an elaboration of this point. 
“The cognitive nature of both [maps and statistics] turned on a particular version of space, ‘abstract 
space’, which had first been elaborated at least as early as the seventeenth century. This now lent itself 
to the social sciences as once it had been integral to the foundation of the natural ones” (Joyce 2003: 
35). 19th century maps, thus, drew on the notion of abstract space (recall Mercator, Chapter I) and on 
demographics (which we discussed in Chapter III). Note, also, the point he makes in the second 
sentence, about the transfer of knowledge between the natural and social sciences, which we have also 
seen take place in the theory of evolution. 
  
What can engineers do? 
Nevertheless, we should be in no doubt regarding the extraordinary effort that was made to 
deal with cholera, even without (the search for) a definitive theory of causation. On the contrary, that 
the Victorians had no understanding of the true cause of the illness makes their efforts all the more 
impressive. Famously, the city of London to this day looks in large part how it does thanks to the 
chief engineer of the sewer system, Joseph Bazalgette. The sewer system was a direct response to the 
new, Victorian, that is, social illnesses. Let me be clear: of course sporadic instances of various illnesses, 
such as cholera, typhus and typhoid existed prior to the massive urbanization in western Europe in 
the 19th century; however, they only grew to the level of epidemics with the population growth – this 
is what I mean in labeling them ‘social illnesses’.  
One way of looking at Bazalgette’s achievement is that he produced the blueprint for how 
urban areas would develop thereafter. However else cities the world over would grow from then on, 
40  
they had to make room, to incorporate, the agents of these illnesses. Bazalgette did not know what that 
agent was – although the world would soon find out – but he knew to, as it were, pull up a chair to 
the negotiating table for it.  
Allow me to elaborate this point just a little. The immensity of this shift that accommodates 
this new agent goes beyond a response to the new social illnesses of the 19th century, impressive as 
that was. In his groundbreaking book Plagues and Peoples, William H. McNeill points out that “[u]ntil 
the nineteenth century, cities had everywhere been population sumps, incapable of maintaining 
themselves without constant replenishment from a healthier countryside” (1978: 242). (Little wonder 
then that economists and demographers placed so much value on land and considered the true 
economy of a country to lie in agriculture.) It was not merely the population surge in the cities, but 
sanitation projects that allowed cities demographic autonomy from rural areas. McNeill is explicit: 
“[b]y 1900, therefore, for the first time since cities had come into existence almost five thousand years 
previously, the world’s urban populations became capable of maintaining themselves and even 
increasing in numbers without depending on in-migration from the countryside” (1978: 243). 
Only by accommodating these ‘new agents’ could human communities grow and maintain 
themselves on their own. And these agents are still with us. When sanitation systems function well, 
we allow ourselves the illusion that there is no longer any issue. But the truth is that we are still very 
much forced to acknowledge the presence and action of this agent, even if it only becomes evident in 
situations when the system designed to incorporate them in the human community breaks down. 
Examples abound: an outbreak of cholera was reported in Algeria in August of 2018 (Al Jazeera); a 
year prior, Yemen suffered as many as 1,500 deaths in an epidemic that counted a suspected 300,000 
people (Kamali Dehghan 2017). We only notice the necessity of Bazalgette’s chair at the negotiating 
table when it breaks or is removed; but one way or another, the agent it is meant for is present. 
 
Pasteur: facts & figures 
Be that as it may, at this point in our story – in the mid 19th century – medicine had little use 
for such agents. In a move reminiscent of Galileo and van Leeuwenhoek, the decisive step would 
come from an outsider whose training was in chemistry. Recall that Biagioli’s Galileo is a figure as 
brilliant at leveraging social credit and debt as he was at observation and science. For different reasons 
and in a somewhat different context, we saw van Leeuwenhoek also entangled in social networks that 
spilled over into and were influenced by his observations. We now encounter a comparably complex 
figure in Louis Pasteur. By the time he was fifty years old, Pasteur was awarded an annual state pension 
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by the French National Assembly. Before he was sixty, a plaque honoring him was placed on the 
house of his birth. And before he turned sixty-six, in 1888, the French state opened the Institut 
Pasteur, of which he was head until his death in 1895 – effectively turning a human being into an 
institution (Geison 1995).  
Before all that, however, Pasteur was a chemist crystallographer, first in Strasbourg, then in 
Lille. In The private science of Louis Pasteur, Gerald Geison takes a scrutinizing look at the great French 
scientist by analyzing his private notebooks and diaries, which had only become available to the public 
nearly a hundred years after Pasteur’s death. Perhaps even more interesting than how Louis Pasteur 
became Institut Pasteur, that is, the human became – as Geison calls him – a legend, is the smaller 
question at the root of the larger one: how did a crystallographer become biologist, become 
immunologist, become science paragon? 
In The Pasteurization of France, Bruno Latour calls Pasteur’s steps a series of “sideways” moves 
(1988: 68), but Geison goes into more detail about the increments of the scientist’s transition. First, 
prior to 1857, Pasteur was a run-of-the-mill chemist who had made discoveries of optical isomers in 
tartrates in 1848. Geison rejects the ‘just-so’ stories in which Pasteur takes an interest in wine 
fermentation at the request of a student who happens to be the son of an industrialist. Instead, Geison 
posits that Pasteur’s crystallization experiments, as well as certain underlying beliefs he held pushed 
him to shift his subject (1995: 92). Pasteur’s work was in right-handedness and left-handedness of 
crystals. His conviction, which he tried to prove through tireless experimentation, was that only one 
of the two kinds belongs to the living world and is associated with life. These ideas were simply the 
scientific subject of the day in the field of chemistry (Geison 1995). 
When he hit a wall in his experimentation, Pasteur shifted his focus slightly, but decisively. 
Between the months of August and December of 1857, Pasteur would publish two articles, one right 
after the other, and also move from the northern town of Lille to the capital Paris. The first article 
was on lactic fermentation, and it caused a bit of a stir among biochemists with its bold claims. With 
the move to Paris and publishing notes on alcoholic fermentation – which was the bigger subject at 
the time, not least because of the industrial development of beer- and wine-making – Pasteur was 
wading into a raging battle.  
The debate among chemists was whether alcoholic fermentation was a purely chemical 
process, that is, an interaction between inert substances, or whether something biological was 
involved. Pasteur’s audacity was to claim that his experimental methods – scholars agree that he was 
a brilliant and indefatigable experimenter – could resolve the issue in favor of the biological side. This 
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also, it should be said, was largely ‘the French’ side, as opposed to German, in the debate: Geison 
writes that the scientific debate “clearly drew some of its heat from nationalism” (1995: 108).  
Latour and Geison agree that we have here the elements of Pasteur’s success. Placing himself 
at the very heart of an already raging debate, bringing with him his laboratory skills, but also his skills 
of rhetorician and demonstrator. The debate is on a subject that has larger implications than merely 
scientific truth (such as more efficient wine-making) and Pasteur is masterful at igniting the broader 
public’s imagination with the possibilities offered by his side of the debate. Whether or not he was 
right in his scientific work, and whether or not the rest of the scientific community considered him 
right in his scientific work (and the two are not the same), Pasteur was able to present himself as right 
to audiences at large. That is, he told the non-scientific public that he was able to resolve the debate 
with his experimental methods, making his scientific star shine ever brighter.  
The same underlying belief that living organisms were involved in the fermentation of alcohol 
led him, in the mid 1860s, to once again shift his focus, this time to an even ‘bigger’ question: whether 
disease was the result of germs or ‘spontaneous generation’. Geison paints quite a lively picture for an 
evening at the Sorbonne in 1864 when Pasteur – in the presence of “tout Paris” (1995: 110) – first 
outlines the (incredibly wide) scope of the question, before declaring that 
Neither religion, nor philosophy, nor atheism, nor materialism, nor spiritualism has any place 
here. I may even add as a scientist, I don’t much care. It is a question of fact. I have approached 
it without preconceived idea, equally ready to declare – if experiment had imposed the view 
on me – that spontaneous generations exist… (quoted in Geison 1995: 111). 
 
This is rhetoric at its finest! ‘I do not care’, ‘it is merely fact’, ‘no preconceived ideas’, ‘equally ready to 
declare one or the other truth’, and my favorite, ‘the experiment imposes a view’. It is not me speaking, 
it is the experiment, fact, truth, objective science…!  
 
Observation as weapon/observers as warriors 
The word ‘experiment’ is crucial here. When Pasteur waded into these debates, he was not 
alone. He came armed with his lab equipment. Pasteur “…did not abandon the laboratory methods 
acquired in crystallography,” (Latour 1988: 68) and “…again he brought onto the laboratory terrain 
problems that had not previously been there and capitalized on the attention of an educated public 
that was already much larger than the industrialist public…” (ibid.: 69). It was a century and a half 
later, but here was another tireless observer, this time able to weaponize both van Leeuwenhoek’s 
instrument and his insights. 
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Three words, I think, bear some elaborating here: instrument, insights, and weaponize. Upon 
his death, van Leeuwenhoek donated his microscopes to the Royal Society. Brian J. Ford tells us that 
for the next hundred years, they were acknowledged as still having the best lenses in the world (2015: 
132). However, Ford goes on to recount that a certain Sir James South wrote a letter in 1855, asking 
“the Society’s secretary to find out where the missing microscopes might be…” (ibid., my emphasis). 
Somewhere between 1820 and 1855 then, the collection of microscopes was lost. Yet despite the 
microscope’s loss of status within science (which, as I mentioned, occurred already in van 
Leeuwenhoek’s time), advances of the instrument continued. Van Leeuwenhoek’s lenses were still the 
best, but there were any number of other improvements that technicians made in the interim: fixed 
concave or plane mirrors, pillar stands, diaphragms, water immersed lenses… – all allowed the 
observer to see better (Bradbury 1967). It is perhaps fitting that van Leeuwenhoek’s microscopes 
should be lost, for their purpose of seeing was not exactly the same as those that would come to be 
used in the 19th century. Namely, as I mentioned, the Dutchman was well-nigh obsessed with merely 
seeing things as small as he could. To him, in general, his animalcules were wonderful curiosities. 
When the 19th century finally caught up with the ability to see so small, it was seeing with a purpose. 
For example, both sides in the mentioned chemistry debate about whether a living organism was 
involved in the making of wine used the microscope – purposefully – to advance their theories (Barnett 
and Barnett 2011). In that sense, Pasteur was no different: the microscope was to him only one of a 
number of tools in his belt, and much more of an instrument (while for van Leeuwenhoek it was much 
more an end in itself). 
In similar fashion that Pasteur and the 19th century used the microscope slightly differently, 
they had a different approach to van Leeuwenhoek’s ideas of population. Perhaps because he wished 
to see entities as small as he could, although he saw many, many of them, van Leeuwenhoek kept 
focusing on individual creatures. For Pasteur, what was important was a culture, that is, a collection, 
a mass of germs or ‘yeast’ cells. It was important they be of a single species (a pure culture), but not 
that they be single. (Pasteur was not the first to produce a method for growing/isolating pure cultures; 
that distinction – much to Pasteur’s chagrin – would go to the German Robert Koch [Barnett and 
Barnett 2011].)  
Furthermore, in the intervening two centuries or so between van Leeuwenhoek and Pasteur, 
there were ‘more populations’ in Europe, by which I do not only mean that there were more human 
beings, but also that there were many distinct and dense ‘populations’ in cities that provided quasi-lab 
conditions. While van Leeuwenhoek’s insights into the human population on Earth was brilliant for 
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its time, the 18th century, as we have seen, saw a lot more thinking conducted on this topic. Pasteur 
was able to apply much of this thinking in his own work, which is part of the reason he could be 
interested in (populations of) chickens, cows, sheep, silk worms, humans, etc. By raising them to the 
level of population, Pasteur was able to reduce the distance between humans and animals and 
animalcules. If Pasteur did not wish to see the single animalcule in the way van Leeuwenhoek desired 
to, it was because cities/labs taught him that only a whole culture of germs was effective (at whatever 
it did), and it was only relevant for entire populations of animals or humans. Pasteur was not a doctor 
treating an individual human patient; he was a scientist whose subject was the entire (animal and 
human) population of France. 
Just like English doctors and social reformers, Pasteur’s goal was never only scientific (in the 
narrow sense of the word). France, the country, was always the aim. Although we think of him today 
as one of the central figures of the golden age of microbiology, his work could just as easily be 
presented in the domain of nation-building, that is, as politics. (In this sense I refer to Pasteur 
weaponizing van Leeuwenhoek’s observations.)  
After the move from crystallography to fermentation came the move from fermentation to 
microbes; followed by the move to study disease-causing pathogens; followed by a move to fight the 
disease; followed by a move towards animal vaccines; followed by a move “to work on all of society” 
(Latour 1988: 70). Each time, just like the first, Pasteur brought his crystallography laboratory 
equipment with him, bringing it to bear on an ever-increasing field. Even at its founding, the Institut 
Pasteur was clearly meant to be involved in all aspects of French society. (All the way down to its 
colonies: in the mentioned example of the 2018 cholera outbreak, the news outlet Al Jazeera mentions 
the role of the Institut Pasteur of Algeria [Al Jazeera 2018].) 
Indeed, Latour details the way Pasteur and Pasteurians took the lab out into the field with 
them (traveling to French farms as well as the colonies), and brought the world into the lab (Latour 
1988). In developing the importance of the lab for society, though, the Pasteurians also developed the 
importance of the living organisms they studied – microbes. Although they would have perhaps 
abhorred the comparison (for a number of reasons), Pasteur was performing a similar task to Joseph 
Bazalgette and the English doctors: he was constructing a social space for the microbes (to repeat my 
metaphor from earlier, building them a chair at the negotiating table).   
But before the 19th century scientists could construct a social space for microbes, they had to 
provide a purely microbial one. Scientists offered them “…an environment entirely adapted to their 
wishes…” (Latour 1988: 82, emphasis in the original). After Koch demonstrated his ability to grow 
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pure cultures at the International Medical Congress in 1881 (Barnett and Barnett 2011: 28), he 
formulated “a specific set of [four] guidelines for determining the cause of infectious diseases, now 
known as Koch’s postulates” (Lerner and Lerner 2003: 247). The second of these postulates reads: 
“The organism must be isolated from a host with the corresponding disease and grown in pure 
culture” (ibid.). That is to say, an integral and necessary step in constructing a social space for microbes 
was to first remove them from farm animals and human bodies and give them their own environment. 
However inadvertent, the phrase ‘pure culture’ is both misleading and more revealing than at 
first glance. Of course scientists referring to pure culture mean certain living beings isolated from their 
original environment, and thus are still natural beings (and not cultural ones). On the other hand, what 
could be more human than bringing the entire force of a scientific lab to isolate a single species of 
bacteria. What could be more artificial, that is, less natural than ripping these few cells out of their 
native environment and placing them in space cleared of everything but their own food (the medium). 
Latour illustrates this scene thus: “imagine an anthrax bacillus which has lived or millions of years 
hidden in the crowd of its cousins. One day it finds itself alone with its children under the blinding 
light of a microscope that is dominated by Pasteur’s enormous beard” (1998: 224). Bacteria isolated 
in the way Koch described and demanded could scarcely be a more purely cultural product.  
At this point, I need to circle back to my discussion of Grotius from Part I. In discussing his 
book Free Sea, I mentioned how the new framework Grotius set up required the elaboration of certain 
fictions of nature. In attempting to “free” the sea for the Dutch, Grotius had to posit certain parts of 
the world over which no one had, nor could have, sovereignty (such as the oceans). His principle of 
what could properly fall under (someone’s) sovereignty was that it was not (somehow) natural. In 
addition to the seas, wild lands, fish, fowl, animals did not fall under anyone’s sovereignty. Grotius’ 
underlying ontology (although by no means only his) was a rather clear-cut distinction between the 
social and natural realms.  
It is difficult to overstate just how deeply embedded this distinction is in (what we call) 
Western civilization. The modern idea (also to be found in Grotius, as mentioned) of nature as mere 
resource is of a piece with this ontological division. On the other side is human society as intelligent, 
holding agency, and – crucially for us – sovereign. And this sovereignty lies not only in that of a 
government over a territory or a people, but sovereignty over an ontological division between nature 
and culture.  
When the followers of Koch ‘purify a culture’ in isolating a bacterium, they are equally 
purifying the social. Because if the purification of a culture requires such strict regulations and 
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conditions to be called ‘pure’, it sets clear and strict criteria for the distinction nature/culture. As Richie 
Nimmo writes in his book Milk, Modernity and the Making of the Human: Purifying the Social, the “…effect 
was to purify the boundary between the human and the animal, crucially by rendering the animal body 
– and particularly liquid milk – ‘safe’ for human consumption” (2010: 92). Nimmo is specifically 
writing about cows, milk, and the dairy industry in a period that largely coincides with the one we are 
dealing with, between 1865 and the mid 20th century (Nimmo 2010). He adds that “the struggle to 
control cattle disease was far more than an economic issue, for at the same time it was an attempt to 
maintain a given ontology, which crystallized a specific form of socio-natural order” (2010: 77). 
Remove the word cattle from that sentence, and my point stands.  
Yet, if this nature/culture distinction “is not given in the nature of human practice, but is a 
historical and material accomplishment brought into being by networks of practice” (Nimmo 2010: 
77), there is another important aspect to this story. The distinction does not get established once and 
for all; indeed, Swift depended on it for the grotesque effect he wished to produce with his satirical 
essay, Malthus re-asserted it in his discourse on populations, and it was reiterated by those who wished 
to control epidemics among humans and animals. That is to say, the distinction is being continuously 
re-affirmed. In one of his later moves, Pasteur the immunologist shifted from inoculating sheep and 
cattle to vaccinating humans (famously with the case of Joseph Meister). This breakthrough was also 
followed by an ideological stance. Latour quotes a Pasteurian, Landouzy, who says that “the day will 
come when, thanks to militant, scientific hygiene, diseases will disappear” (quoted in Latour 1988: 27-
8). It is the word ‘militant’ with which I would like to justify saying that Pasteur and Pasteurians 
weaponized van Leeuwenhoek. The unbridled optimism in Landouzy’s statement is not surprising, and 
none of the words, except for militant, seem out of place. The Pasteurians did not just insert (a word 
that Latour uses numerous times to describe their conduct) themselves into chains of power, they 
positioned themselves as the defenders of humanity. Defenders from what? From, microbes, of 
course. “The state defends its frontiers with soldiers against large-scale enemies and with doctors 
against small-scale ones” (1988: 95), writes Latour.  
Significantly, militaristic ideology is not at all out of place here. Latour opens his book with an 
account of Tolstoy’s reading of the Battle of Borodino. Later he points out that the scientists’ struggle 
against microbes was relevant because (at least until the 20th century) “in wartime, as is well known, 
there are more deaths from microbes than from the enemy” (1988: 115). But most obviously, the 
frontier defense against microbes took place at the actual frontiers of European empires – in the 
colonies.  
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As McNeill suggests when discussing the millennium-long struggle between the microparasites 
and the macroparasites, a struggle that seem to him to be the motive force of history, [in the 
19th century] the scale is turned in favor of the macroparasites. The rich and the empires will 
at last be able to spread. Hitherto, especially in the tropics, they could never go very far. Their 
most faithful factotums soon died. Now, wherever the Pasteurians and hygienists gained 
ground, the microparasites lost ground (Latour 1988: 41). 
 
Or to quote McNeill directly (without Latour’s flourishes): “In fact, the penetration of the 
interior of Africa that became a prominent feature of Europe’s expansion in the second half of the 
nineteenth century would have been impossible without quinine from the Dutch plantations” (1978: 
247). 
The story of modern sovereignty, therefore, circles back to the Dutch 17th century and its 
colonial expansion into Asia. It is not coincidental that Grotius’ understanding of sovereignty required 
several ‘natural myths’. Nor is it an accident that European scientists in the late 19th century saw 
themselves as standing guard over the frontiers of sovereign civilized territory, defending it.  
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Chapter V: Changing Perspectives 
 
Begin with Vermeer’s Milkmaid. The stunning blue of the apron, the light streaking through 
the window, the freshly-baked bread, the milk being poured slowly, carefully, its stream twisting— In 
this case, let us stay for a moment with the scopophilia of painting: painters know a thing or two about 
the pleasure of looking, especially at a subject that cannot look back. There is a hierarchy developing 
here, structured by the gaze. That the subject being looked at is a lone young woman, only reinforces 
the hierarchical and dominating aspect of observation. Vermeer did not help matters by placing the 
body so centrally, unavoidably to the eyes, nor by lending it corpulence and heft: look, look at the 
body.  
Yet, I think Vermeer is cleverer than to remain with a pretty picture. There is a turn here. 
Perhaps it begins by noticing that this woman is lost in thought and the viewer cannot help but wonder 
what is she thinking about; or by being drawn to the milk, the viewer’s attention thus being taken away 
from the female body and possible salaciousness towards the mundane task, the near ritual of the 
scene. The observer might then become conscious of one’s own viewing, that one has stared a little 
too long for comfort, that it is a little unseemly to gaze so intently at something that cannot even 
glance back.  
Painters know a thing or two about the pleasure of staring/gazing/observing but, 
unsurprisingly, are also painfully aware of its inherent ambivalence. What one brings to the painting 
when looking at it is just as important as what is on it. And yet what one brings to the painting remains 
invisible, much like the person who has stumbled onto the milkmaid. Staring at a painting is what 
Haraway referred to as the “god trick,” ‘disembodied vision from nowhere’ (1988: 581). She goes on 
to note that when this disembodied vision from nowhere is “endlessly enhanced” it becomes 
“unregulated gluttony” (ibid.).  
I would like to follow Vermeer’s turn and ask questions not of the canvas, but of the viewer. 
Who is looking? what does it mean to look/gaze/stare/observe? what does it mean to take pleasure 
in catching a glimpse/watching/observing? what is the relation between the one who sees and the 
subject? who, after all, is the subject and who or what the object? In making the young woman pour 
out some milk, Vermeer is forcing us to notice that even a banal, quotidian, domestic scene can be 
seen differently, depending on who is looking, what they wish to see, what their disposition is. Take 
the milk, for example: we might look at the painting and wonder at the difference in relationship to 
the milk between the farmer who sold it, the woman in the kitchen transferring it from one vessel to 
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another, and the owner of the house consuming it. We could also marvel, as Richie Nimmo does, at 
the completely different relation to milk we have today in comparison to 17th century Holland, 
wondering if it is even the same substance. 
 
Milk/milk 
As Nimmo carefully describes in his book: this substance stands at the nexus of the human, 
the animal, disease, materiality, ideology. He shows how in the period in question, from the mid 19th 
to the mid 20th century, liquid milk underwent a profound change. From a substance that varied in 
taste, texture, fat content, and could only be consumed shortly upon being obtained from the animal, 
that is, locally, and thus bearing all the hallmarks of the local environment, to a substance of consistent, 
standardized texture, fat content, prepared (Pasteurized) and purified, transportable at distance, mass 
produced, and mass consumed (Nimmo 2010). The materiality of milk had to change (had to become 
social) in response to the danger microbes posed to a larger, denser human population. Along with 
the animal itself, the wild, unpredictable substance had to be stabilized before it could be allowed entry 
into the human/social domain. Nimmo writes: “milk was thereby not merely standardized but at the 
same time humanized […] cows being merely the organic machines […] utilized for this production” 
(2010: 131, emphasis in the original). This seems to me to be a continuation of Grotius’ sovereign 
natural fiction(s): nature as resource belonging to one who is able to transfer it across the imposed 
nature/society line. 
It needs to be said that on the quotidian level, the drawing of this strong line between 
nature/society, is only a consequence of the more basic power-seeking politics. Just as Grotius’ natural 
fictions issued from, but then also grounded his real motivation, i.e. a Holland on par with Portugal, 
so too the ‘humanizing’ of milk (to use Nimmo’s terms) was only a consequence of the more basic 
race to wealth and power among the great empires of Europe. It is no secret that Pasteur explicitly 
saw his discoveries and his rivalry with Koch as openly nationalist endeavors (Latour 1988, Geison 
1995, Barnett and Barnett 2011). And Nimmo writes: 
It is unsurprising then that the [British] Board of Agriculture became preoccupied with 
extensive comparisons between British and German milk production, as the primary axis of 
economic competition tilted away from financial rivalries between private companies and 
towards military-industrial rivalries between nation-states (2010: 57). 
 
It may appear that we are here speaking of two types or levels of sovereignty: national 
sovereignty (of, say, England or France) and ‘ontological’ sovereignty (of culture over nature). But I 
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would like to claim that we are not. How so? What is the relation between these seemingly two types 
of sovereignty? One issues from and also grounds the other. To reiterate my argument from Part I, 
Grotius’ free sea was a ploy to declare the Low Countries legally equal to Portugal. For Dutch 
sovereignty to exist, that is, for the Dutch to be legally equal to the Portuguese (and Spanish, and 
English…), there had to be a free sea. Free here meant simply under no particular (national or royal) 
sovereignty, but it was also equivalent to natural (wild), outside the social. 
The strong distinction between nature and society, or to give it a punctuation sign, between 
nature/society, was indeed a consequence of a more prosaic struggle. (That is to say, Nimmo’s 
ontological role of milk as humanized is a byproduct of the British rivalry with Germany.) But the 
nature/society distinction was also the condition of possibility of national sovereignty: without the 
free sea or liquid milk or (nature as) resources in general – the notion of a sovereign nation would 
make no sense. Therefore, the ‘two sovereignties’ are really expressions of one and the same 
sovereignty. 
 
World war flu 
Nimmo notes that the crucial historical event in the change from milk to milk (if I may indicate 
the shift thus) is “…the impact of the First World War, which meant that the national economy 
suddenly became viewed not merely in terms of wealth creation but also, very substantially, in terms 
of the security of the nation-state” (2010: 57). I would like to elaborate and expand this idea somewhat. 
The national economy, first of all, was always also a matter of security. We have seen this in Malthusian 
population thinking, as well as Pasteur’s inoculation efforts. (I do not think I am not correcting 
Nimmo here: his use of the ‘viewed’ makes me think that what was already true now became obvious.) 
More importantly, however, it seems useful at this point to think about the First World War 
(beyond Nimmo’s focus on milk, but including it) as both the complete development of the kind of 
sovereignty Grotius introduced three hundred years prior, and (the beginning of) its end. Not least 
because the European powers had largely finished their colonial carving up of the world. By 1914, as 
both McNeill and Latour noted, the last portions of the interior of Africa had fallen to the 
Europeans/Pasteurians. In support of this idea of (a) sovereignty’s end, Richard Tuck cites no greater 
authority than Max Weber in saying “The historical origin of modern freedom [sic!] has had certain 
unique preconditions which will never repeat themselves. […] there is no new continent at our 
disposal” (quoted in Tuck 2001: 15). Indeed, in the conclusion of his book, Tuck goes on to claim 
that:  
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A view of the international arena in which states had an array of thickly described obligations 
to one another…would not have produced the vision of autonomous agents which actually 
gripped European writers four hundred years ago. That vision grew out of a sense of the world 
as populated by autarchic and sovereign states warily constructing temporary alliances of 
convenience between themselves (2001: 226). 
 
By the end of the 19th century, European nations indeed had “an array of thickly described 
obligations to one another.” For our purposes, it is sufficient to point to one aspect of society in which 
this occurred. The first International Sanitary Conference was held in Paris in 1851. David P. Fidler 
details the number, variety and scope of international treaties on public health between 1851 and 1951. 
“Not only is the number of treaties impressive but so also is their range of subject matter – human, 
plant and animal diseases are all subjects of treaty law” (Fidler 2001: 265).  
There is an irony here. Pasteurians were indeed, as Latour says, willing defenders of the state 
from microbial enemies; at the same time, however, they were unwittingly undermining the rationale 
(the sovereignty) of that state. And World War I is the best illustration of this. One of the very basic 
conditions of total war was the economic and biological efficiency with which the European nations 
entered it: 
In the decade before World War I another important medical discovery altered the 
epidemiology of European armies profoundly, for it was between 1909 and 1912 that the role 
of the louse in spreading typhus fever was figured out. This, together with systematic 
immunization against other common infections, was what made the unexampled concentration of 
millions of men in the trenches of northern France, 1914-18, medically possible (McNeill 1978: 
252, my emphasis). 
 
Nor should we forget that the development of cities that provided the military industry (and as we 
have seen with Nimmo, the food) for the war would not have been possible without the hygiene, 
sanitation, medical advancements of the previous seventy years. 
The Pasteurians, it seems, overplayed their hand. As I mentioned, Pasteur and other scientists 
sought methods that would develop the wealth and health of the humans, animals and industry of 
each their own country. They believed that by finding ways to control microbes, they would be able 
to do this. In reality, however, in times of peace, ‘controlling microbes’ meant cooperation with those 
competing sovereign states, such that they were “undermining the ability of the sovereign state to control 
public health in its territories” (Fidler 2001: 263, my emphasis). It was in the mid-nineteenth century 
that “European states realized that they could no longer control diseases, such as cholera, through 
national measures alone but had to engage in international cooperation to achieve that objective” 
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(ibid.: 263-4). In times of war it was even worse, for the scientists had only provided the conditions 
for an even greater slaughter than had been previously possible.  
And that is when it looked like they had command of the microbes. The final year of World 
War I provided a brutal demonstration of the limits of control doctors and scientists held over 
microbes: the influenza pandemic. No mere illness breakout, not only did it claim many times over 
the number of lives of the war, it was so tightly bound up with the war, that I would like to propose 
they be considered not as an epidemic exacerbated or even caused by the war, but as a single event 
(which I would like to call World War Flu). We have already seen how the (scale of the) war was 
caused by (the handling of) pathogens. But the specific form the influenza took points to an even 
stronger connection between the pan-war and the pandemic. “The environmental conditions 
associated with the trench warfare of World War I could hardly have been more favorable for the 
evolution of increased virulence of airborne pathogens like influenza” (Ewald 1994: 110). Paul Ewald’s 
use of the word ‘evolution’ there suggests that the war may have created its own specific pathogen – 
at once bespoke and mass consumed. Equally remarkably, “the 1918 epidemic displayed an unusual 
penchant for the destruction of healthy and productive individuals in the prime of their lives” (Price-
Smith 2009: 60). Ordinarily, the flu takes the lives of the very young, the old, the weak. The 1918 
pandemic destroyed the same population (young men) that usually perishes in battle. Hence, one 
event.  
My point is merely that World War Flu marks the full expression and also the conceptual end 
of our approach to microbes and sovereignty. If the extraordinary achievements of the second half of 
the 19th century were grounds for Landouzy’s (and not only his) boundless optimism (Chapter IV), 
then it is clear that the first half of the 20th century swiftly put those fantasies to rest. Much more 
prophetic, it turns out, was the use of the word ‘militaristic’ (which I am sure Landouzy only meant as 
a figure of speech) (quoted in Latour 1988: 27-28). If I may return to my own figure of speech from 
before, the invisible agent at the negotiating table countered Landouzy’s offer with a vengeance. 
Above all, this was an agent that demanded to be seen as just that, an agent.  
 
Changing perspectives, the microbe(’)s turn 
If the doctors, scientists, immunologists were supposed to be our (or our state’s) defense 
against microparasites, at best it has been a stalemate, and a temporary one at that. The truth of the 
matter is, however, that, irrespective of the outcome of the battle against microbes, the very paradigm 
of war is really out of place. The stalemate only makes sense if we consider the disease-causing 
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microbes: yes, typhus, polio, etc. have been eliminated to a large extent, while on the other hand 
cholera is still present and malaria and tuberculosis continue to be a problem worldwide. But this is 
only a fraction of all the microbes and microbial species. World War Flu was a lesson in the 
impossibility of containment, but at the same time, perhaps there was no need to attempt to contain 
them in the first place. We could say then, that the ‘other’ lesson of World War Flu was to look more 
closely at microbes and their role on Earth. 
The first time microbes were ‘discovered’, their presence was so astonishing that even their 
discoverer(s) had little to no idea at what they were looking. The second time they would assume 
relevance for human society, let us say after 1850, it was in the midst of the industrial world’s arms 
race against nature. For the capitalistically-oriented mind, nature had always been a resource to be 
drawn, exploited, transformed into commodity and transmuted into currency. In Donna Haraway’s 
words, “[n]ature [was] only the raw material of culture, appropriated, preserved, enslaved, exalted, or 
otherwise made flexible for disposal by culture in the logic of capitalist colonialism” (1988: 592). Our 
examples of Locke, Franklin, Malthus attest to that approach towards people as well as land. With the 
industrial revolution, the efforts to seize and subjugate nature acquired unheard of proportions. 
Malthus’ idea of the finiteness of resources was perhaps an intuition of this. (Again, a great example 
of this are Grotius’ fish, which the industrial revolution allowed to be caught on an unprecedented 
scale.) 
In this context, microbes walk onto the stage just at the moment when we (humans) think we 
have been able to completely conquer nature, and they are spoiling the fun. Little surprise then that 
in the dominant paradigm of the so-called golden age of microbiology, its first seventy years or so, 
microbes were seen as nothing other than pathogens. Perhaps we can read Landouzy’s statement less 
as prophecy and more as a call to arms or even propaganda. And perhaps also understand a little better 
just how Pasteur came to be a national hero in his own life time, considering this is an honor given to 
military commanders much more often than scientists: because he was indeed sort of a general in a 
(not so sort of a) war.  
As we saw, the paradigm imploded onto itself. In truth, the golden boys of microbiology knew 
so very little about microbes. I do not mean this as a slight, nor do I think that their war paradigm was 
even remotely the only thing that prevented them from properly comprehending the scale of the issue. 
In part, they knew so little because, barring van Leeuwenhoek, they were the first to take microbes (in 
one way or another) seriously, and did so to the best of their abilities. In fact, even to this day, if ever 
there were something that strains human understanding in so many ways, it is microbes. Everything 
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from their minuteness, their numbers, diversity of form, living conditions, longevity, durability, 
communication, behavior – staggers the mind. Pick up any book on bacteria, the likelihood is the first 
chapter will overflow with numerical representations, scale comparisons, illustrative analogies, all 
guaranteed to leave your head spinning (Bakalar 2003, Hird 2009, Maczulak 2011, Morris 2007). One 
idea that all the authors seem to agree upon (and after just that first chapter!) is that it is a microbial 
world and we are just living in it. 
What is clear, though, is that the metaphor of war as our main relation to microbes simply will 
not do. There are certainly times, just as there were before the postulation of germ theory of disease, 
when a person or a population stands in direct opposition to a species or species of microbes; but 
from even the little we do know about them, microbes simply do too much in our world to be reduced 
to occasionally killing a few members of a large primate species.  
This is not only for the sake of some scientific honesty or cosmic humility. The geographer 
Elizabeth Dunn writes on this intersection of bacteria and governmentality. In her essay “Escherichia 
coli, Corporate Discipline and the Failure of the Sewer State,” she discusses the (failures of the) 
American food system (Dunn 2007). The conception of the state that emerges from her research on 
food safety is not flattering: “[t]his was just one instance of one of the most important bases of state 
power: the state’s ability to act as sewer” (2007: 41). In support of her view, she quotes the French 
psychoanalyst Dominique Laporte, who is even more direct and succinct: “Surely, the State is the 
Sewer” (quoted in Dunn 2007: 42). I have nothing against Dunn’s invective against the greedy and 
harmful actions of the US food industry and irresponsibility of its government – sewer might be the 
right word. However, the premise is that the state (as such, necessarily) attempts to purify culture, to 
excrete toxins, all in defense against a given species of microbe, E. coli. The paradigm in which we reduce 
microbes to enemies who make us soil our pants is also the paradigm in which we reduce the state to 
a sewer. 
Indeed, I am in general suspicious of the paradigm of defense. More than anything else, perhaps, 
the claim to defense – of the open sea, national borders, resources, one’s body – has been used as the 
centerpiece around which to construct problematic ideas. As we have seen, Grotius used it to justify 
the seizure of the Portuguese galley, Hobbes to defend his selfish individual (Tuck 2001), Pasteur to 
force an entire nation to follow his medical protocols, etc. Consider how different the relationship to 
the world is when defense is no longer the framing device: 
I love the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 10 percent of all the cells that 
occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the 
genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such, some of which play in a symphony necessary 
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to my being alive at all, and some of which are hitching a ride and doing the rest of me, of us, 
no harm (Haraway 2008: 3-4). 
 
Haraway is referencing one of those facts to be found in every first chapter of books on bacteria. 
Scientific estimates are that there are ten times as many bacterial cells in and around us than there are 
human; and there are a hundred times more bacterial than human genes. Further, Haraway notes the 
role (‘the symphony’) of microbes in one’s being alive in the first place.** (Paul G. Falkowski titled his 
book on microbes “Life’s Engines” – this is no metaphor [2015].)  
The section of Haraway’s book from which I have taken the above quote is called “We Have 
Never Been Human,” a nod to Latour’s book We Have Never Been Modern. Referencing the same book 
in “A Symbiotic View of Life: We Have Never Been Individuals,”†† Gilbert, Sapp, and Tauber write: 
The “immune self” model of individuality, first proposed by Sir McFarlane Burnet [in 1949], 
portrays the immune system as a defensive network against a hostile exterior world. The 
immune individual rejects anything that is not “self.” Indeed, the discipline of immunology 
has been called “the science of self/non-self discrimination” (Klein 1982). In this view, the 
immune system is a defensive “weaponry,” evolved to protect the body against threats from 
pathogenic agents: worms, protists, fungi, bacteria, and viruses. […] In a fascinating inversion 
of this view of life, however, recent studies have shown that an individual’s immune system is 
in part created by the resident microbiome (2012: 330). 
 
“For example,” Myra Hird builds on this, “the expression of the enzyme matrilysin used to digest 
proteins and kill harmful bacteria is induced by the bacteria themselves” (2009: 83). Indeed, in the 
same passage, Hird says that “…it turns out that immunity is co-extensive with microbes…” (ibid.). 
Let me abuse Hird’s point by underscoring the phrase ‘turns out’. Because this turn in 
perspective allows us to say that the microbial lesson is that the fiction of the Grotian sovereign 
individual crumbles upon closer scrutiny. As soon as the light is shone back onto him (always him!), 
the oh so important demarcation line between him and the world, between nature/society, dissolves. 
“From this point of view, the natural and the social are not exclusive domains” writes Nimmo, and 
continues, “…sociality is a function of our natural form of life […] it is a configuration of nature, not 
                                                
** Haraway’s more recent book, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (2016), includes some 
discussion of human population control. It seems to me that far from staying with anything, Haraway has 
committed an about-face and lapsed into a neo-Malthusianism, a paradigm of which she was highly critical in 
her earlier work (which I reference). For a more detailed critique, see Sophie Lewis’ article in Viewpoint 
Magazine (2017). 
†† I cannot help but think that Richie Nimmo would find these permutations of Latour’s title wonderfully 
illustrative as they all play on the same theme: modern = human = individual (Nimmo 2010). 
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a departure from it” (2010: 153). With this I would like to not so much close the discussion on 
microbes and sovereignty as properly bring them into a single frame.  
  
57  
Conclusion 
 
At its heart, this text has been about framing, or rather, re-framing. I would like to therefore 
briefly look at why framing is important and what impact re-framing a question might have. A legacy 
essential to the modern world, as I hope to have shown, is the notion of distinct and discrete 
conceptual frames to distinguish between nature/society. Although it has become so deeply embedded 
in (at least the Western) cultural world that it appears as a law of nature, the notion of separate frames 
for nature/society is historically contingent. As such, this idea has cultural roots, a beginning – which 
I have placed in the Dutch 17th century – but also an end – which I have placed around the flu 
pandemic and military events at the beginning of the 20th century.  
I have placed the end of this historical idea around World War I for two reasons. The first one 
is that far from being just one or two more historical occurrences, the world war and flu pandemic 
were in great part the result of this dual framing, of sovereignty and resource. The second reason is that 
the very fact that the world war and the pandemic are considered two events (albeit connected) reveals 
an understanding of the world that applies two frames. Instead, I have argued that this was one event 
– a brutal demonstration that the line between nature/society, if it had ever existed, is no longer 
conceptually viable. 
That is not to say that this conceptual framework has not survived the intervening century; it 
has and is still the dominant conceptual apparatus for humanity’s relationship to the world. 
Nevertheless, conceptually speaking, this notion of strict division of nature/society has badly outgrown 
its utility. Take for example a recent event in the news, when French fishermen allegedly threw smoke 
bombs onto British fishing boats off the coast of Normandy in a “scallops row” (Senkul and Heffer 
2018). I mentioned in Chapter I that when Grotius and Welwod were arguing about fishing off the 
English coast in the early 17th century (Grotius 2004), they could not have dreamed of the notion of 
‘overfishing’. Like a grim joke, Grotius’ theory comes back to haunt us. There is such a thing as 
overfishing (of scallops), and the logic in which the fruits of the sea are simply there for anyone to 
catch, take possession, and claim ownership has resulted in the depletion of the seas and deterioration 
of human relations.  
As trite as the example of the English Channel fishermen is, Grotian sovereignty can do very 
little to solve such a problem. Although this would be a subject for a different paper, sovereignty, as 
we have known it for the last four hundred years or so, is a major obstacle in resolving our global 
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environmental issues. In other words, our leaders are not stupid and governments lazy; but their work 
is conditioned on a framework that prevents them from being able to resolve the problems we face.  
Nor has the Grotian individual fared historically better than his sovereignty. Consider what 
has happened to the human body under the reign of the dual framework. Namely, if society was to be 
circumscribed as distinct and above nature, then the beings that comprise the domain of the social 
had to be separated and placed above nature. At the same time, however, it was quite obvious that in 
body, humans were animals, much (if not exactly) like any other. The human being had to be placed 
on the fault line between the two domains, and split. In other words, Cartesian mind/body dualism 
makes perfect sense in the context of elaboration of these two distinct and clearly demarcated 
frameworks. The mind, the soul, the spiritual fell to the domain of the social, while the body would 
have to satisfy itself by mingling with the other entities of the natural world. The Grotian individual, 
it follows, may be sovereign, but has had to pay for his sovereignty by becoming disembodied.  
In contrast to this fictional, incorporeal human, I propose, once again, Vermeer’s Milkmaid. 
On the one hand, the body is undeniably present, as I have already mentioned. On the other, the 
painting shows her so deeply lost in thought – indeed, perhaps the reason she has taken so long to 
notice us – the painting is begging to be asked ‘what is she thinking about’? There is not the least 
attempt to separate the thoughts and remove them from the body.  
Nor do I think it is an accident that Vermeer chose a woman for subject of a painting in which 
he shows how mind and body come together so effortlessly. Like perhaps Vermeer’s gazing, surveying 
Geographer, the Cartesian subject and the Grotian individual have played out their historical role as male 
characters. Donna Haraway’s essay “Situated Knowledges” (to take but one example), from which I 
have already quoted regarding nature as resource at capitalist disposal, deals precisely with this 
intersection of masculinity, observation, exploitation (Haraway 1988). And Patrick Joyce has alluded 
to the gendered nature of the abstract gaze that oversees modern map-making (Joyce 2003). The 
milkmaid embodies a contrast to much of this thinking. And 20th century feminist thought has perhaps 
done the most to rid us of the notion of this fault line running across our beings. 
As I mentioned in the last chapter, a further major problem with Grotius’ self-interested, 
defensive, and sovereign individual becomes apparent when we take into account microbes. 
Considering them as the enemy (and nothing more) is reductive to the point of falsity. Nor is the 
recent vogue of probiotically engineering one’s gut microbiome far from this same reductive logic 
(consider a recent article in The Guardian by Anthea Lacchia 2018). Both views suffer from setting 
microbes into one of two boxes, good or bad, that is, resource or trash. A consequence of either is 
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Elizabeth Dunn’s “sewer state,” or the other side of that coin, the “vaccination state.” Because another 
area of potential further research could be the question of how microbes, and specifically microbes 
that thrive in large and dense human populations, complicate the relationship between the state and 
the individual.  
Indeed, once considered, microbes call into question sovereignty as we have thought about it 
all these centuries. If sovereignty in general is about control of territory, of rights, of goods, and 
specifically who is in control, it is difficult to come away from even a cursory glance at microbes 
escaping the impression that they are in control, that microbes are sovereign. Even if this is going too 
far, microbes certainly complicate the notion of sovereignty. First, they force otherwise seemingly 
independent agents to interact, such as governments to become signatories to health treaties. Second, 
they display a remarkable tendency to punish countries in which governments renege on duties to 
their citizens, such as in times of war (like the mentioned 2017 cholera outbreak in Yemen) or neglect 
of infrastructure (like the one in Algeria in 2018). Third, they have allowed human beings to multiply 
and live in dense communities, but only on condition that the microbes be taken into account, that is, 
treated as agents in their own right. Fourth, microbes have been part of the drive to think differently 
about lines of demarcation, that is, things such as defense and immunity.  
What Haraway, Latour, and others have emphasized emerges in this new framework is that 
we are not so much in relation with the world, as we are the relation within a world. With microbes, 
with animals big like us, with entire countries. From the macropolitical, to the individual, to the cellular 
level, it is relation all the way down.  
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